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“Tell me a man is dishonest, and I will answer he is no lawyer.  He cannot be,
because he is careless and reckless of justice; the law is not in his heart, is not
the standard and rule of his conduct.”
— Daniel Webster1
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2011, Paul Pless resigned as Assistant Dean for
Admissions and Financial Aid at the University of Illinois College of
Law.  An investigative report issued three days later by the university
revealed that during his seven-year tenure as admissions dean, Pless
had repeatedly lied about the undergraduate grade point averages
(GPA), Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores, and acceptance
rates of applicants to the law school, giving false information to the
American Bar Association (ABA), U.S. News & World Report (U.S.
News), and prospective students, among other deceived parties.2  The
investigators concluded Pless “knowingly and intentionally changed
and manipulated data in order to inflate GPA and LSAT statistics and
decrease acceptance rates.”3  With respect to data for the class of 2014,
investigators found Pless changed the LSAT scores of 109 students
and the GPAs of 58, all upward.4  Pless is a lawyer, having graduated
from Illinois Law in 2003 and joined the state bar of Washington in
2004.  Although the Rules of Professional Conduct governing Wash-
ington lawyers provide that it “is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
1. DANIEL WEBSTER & CALLIE L. BONNEY, THE WISDOM AND ELOQUENCE OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 83 (New York, James B. Alden 1886) (quoting a speech given to the bar
of Charleston, South Carolina on May 10, 1847).
2. See OFFICE OF UNIV. COUNSEL ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: UNI-
VERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW CLASS PROFILE REPORTING 1 (2011) [herein-
after ILLINOIS REPORT], available at http://www.uillinois.edu/our/news/2011/law/
nov7.uofi.finalreport.pdf (The Illinois Report was prepared by Jones Day and
Duff & Phelps under the direction of the Office of University Counsel and the
University Ethics Office.); see also Jodi S. Cohen, A University of Illinois Law
Dean Resigns After Report Details Manipulations of Admissions Data, CHI. TRIB.
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-08/news/ct-met-u-of-i-
law-school-1108-20111108_1_lsat-score-test-scores-data-analysis (explaining na-
ture and breadth of the investigation).
3. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Id. at 3.
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resentation,”5 no public disciplinary action has been taken against
Pless.6
Under the leadership of Mark Sargent, the Dean of Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law who resigned in 2009,7 “individuals at the school
‘knowingly reported’ inaccurate admissions data to the American Bar
Association for years prior to 2010.”8  A Villanova spokesperson said
the discrepancy between reported data and accurate data amounted to
“about 3 points for the average LSAT score and 0.6 percent for the
average GPA.”9  A confidential report prepared for the university by
outside counsel was shared with the ABA, which conducted additional
investigation.  The ABA concluded that Sargent and three other Villa-
nova administrators bore responsibility for the false statements, find-
ing they “acted in secret . . . to prevent other persons . . . from learning
that admissions data was being misreported.”10  Sargent—a scholar of
legal ethics11—remains an active member of the Massachusetts bar
5. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2006).
6. The state bar allows internet searches of discipline records. See Discipline Infor-
mation Search, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.mywsba.org/default.aspx?tabid=
179 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
7. Sargent resigned around the time his name surfaced in a prostitution investiga-
tion. See Kathleen Brady Shea, Ex-Dean Helped Police, Report Says, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (July 3, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-07-03/news/25288787_1_
sargent-prostitution-ring-customer (“According to a report by the Pennsylvania
State Police, Sargent was a customer at a Kennett Township house suspected as
a site for prostitution when police raided it Nov. 25.  He was not charged.”).
8. Martha Neil, Villanova Says Inaccurate LSAT and GPA Data Were “Knowingly
Reported” to the ABA in Prior Years, ABA J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 6:52 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/new_villanova_law_dean/.
9. Jeff Blumenthal, Students, Grads Weigh in on Villanova Law School Scandal,
PHILA. BUS. J. (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/print-
edition/2011/02/18/students-grads-weigh-in-on-villanova.html?page=all.  By “0.6
percent,” the spokesperson seems to have meant 6% of a GPA point, as in the
difference between 3.00 and 3.06.
10. COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR
ASS’N, PUBLIC CENSURE OF VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter VILLANOVA CENSURE], available at http://www.abanow.org/word
press/wp-content/files_flutter/1313428527askewletter_villanova_081211.pdf; see
also Chris Mondics, Law Review: Villanova’s Unseemly Silence over Law-School
Scandal, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 12, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-06-12/
business/29650150_1_law-schools-law-review-averages-and-lsat-scores.
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867, 871,
885 (2004) (describing lawyers who exhibit “an apparent indifference to the mo-
rality of their actions” and arguing, “Perhaps only a more stringent liability re-
gime . . . will make a real difference”); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect
Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (“People steal.  People cheat.  Then they lie
about it.”).
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and has not been disciplined.12  Massachusetts, like Washington, has
a rule prohibiting deceit by lawyers.13
How do men like Pless and Sargent maintain clean disciplinary
records despite years of deceitful stewardship of American law
schools?  Quite simply, no one has pursued disciplinary action.
Meanwhile, legal education is in crisis.  Law professors have slowly
begun to acknowledge that our tuition is too high—and the job pros-
pects of our graduates too poor—for the present law school system to
endure much longer.14  Although concern about the plight of lawyers
and law students is nothing new,15 three phenomena have combined
to increase the difficulty of convincing students to attend law
schools.16  First, the price has increased,17 and all things being equal,
12. Discipline records of Massachusetts lawyers may be searched online. See Attor-
ney Database Search, MASS. BOARD B. OVERSEERS, http://massbbo.org/bbolookup.
php (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
13. See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012).
14. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Matt Leichter,
Tough Choices Ahead for Some High-Ranked Law Schools, AM. LAW. DAILY
(July 3, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=120256
1764452; Bill Henderson, These Data Will Fundamentally Reshape the Legal
Education Industry, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (June 26, 2012), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/06/these-data-will-fundamentally-reshape-
the-legal-education-industry.html (“In summary, our ivory tower is crumbling.
With the ABA putting the employment data in downloadable format on its web-
site, law schools will have to do something completely new and scary to us—we
are going to have to compete to keep our jobs and stay in business.”).
15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LITOWITZ, THE DESTRUCTION OF YOUNG LAWYERS: BEYOND ONE
L (2006); John M. Conley, How Bad Is It Out There?: Teaching and Learning
About the State of the Legal Profession in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1943
(2004); Marilyn Heins et al., Perceived Stress in Medical, Law, and Graduate Stu-
dents, 59 J. MED. EDUC. 169 (1984); Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52
VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER
165–270 (1993) (arguing that certain movements in legal scholarship—such as
law and economics—have undermined “the ideal of the lawyer-statesman in our
country’s law schools”); SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION 113–38 (1994) (offering various criticisms of legal education).
16. The difficulty can be measured in statistics collected by the Law School Admis-
sion Council (LSAC).  Law school applications dropped sharply in the past two
years.  Seeking admission for the class beginning law school in Fall 2010, 87,500
people submitted law school applications, while for Fall 2011, only 78,800 people
submitted law school applications, a decrease of 10%. See LSAC Volume Sum-
mary, L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-
volume-summary.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).  For Fall 2012, 68,000 prospec-
tive students applied, a further decrease of 13.7%. Id.  Matriculation is down too;
the number of first-year law students was 52,488 in 2010 to 2011 and 48,697 in
2011 to 2012. See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded: 1963–2011, A.B.A., http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_ad
missions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013).  As of March 15, 2013, applicants for Fall 2013 were
down 17.6% from that time last year. See Three-Year ABA Volume Comparison,
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selling something at a higher price is more difficult than selling it at a
lower price.18  Second, all things are not equal: The value of legal edu-
cation—at least its monetary value—has dropped because the legal
employment market is terrible for new lawyers and those attempting
to enter the profession.19  Third, prospective buyers—that is, potential
law students—have begun to better understand the price and ex-
pected value of legal education.20  Although the recent crisis is not the
cause of the deceitful practices catalogued below,21 the tough legal
L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-year-
volume.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
17. See Brian Tamanaha, Information About Law Schools, Circa 1960: The Cost of
Attending, BALKINIZATION (May 22, 2011, 5:06 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/05/information-about-law-schools-circa.html.  “Median annual tuition and
fees at private law schools [in the late 1950s] was $475 (range $50-$1050); ad-
justed for inflation, that’s $3,419 in 2011 dollars.  The median for public law
schools was $204 (range $50 - $692), or $1,550 in 2011 dollars.” Id.  By 2009, “the
private law school median was $36,000; the public (resident) median was
$16,546.” Id.; see also Orin Kerr, Law School Tuition Over the Last Forty Years,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/
29/law-school-tuition-over-the-last-forty-years/ (demonstrating the rates over the
past 100 years adjusted for inflation and put in 2011 dollars).
18. If the law school model depends on legal education becoming a Veblen Good,
those rare commodities for which people’s preference for buying them increases
as their price increases, the problems are grave indeed.
19. Katherine Mangan, Unemployment Among Recent Law Graduates Is as Bad as
It’s Ever Been, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 7, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/
Unemployment-Among-Recent-Law/132189/; Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face
Brutal Job Market, WALL. ST. J., June 25, 2012, at A1 (“Members of the law-
school class of 2011 had little better than a 50-50 shot of landing a job as a lawyer
within nine months of receiving a degree, according to a Wall Street Journal
analysis of new data that provides the most detailed picture yet of the grim mar-
ket for law jobs.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Median Starting Pay for Associates Is
No Longer in the Six Figures; Figure Drops 35% in Two Years, ABA J. (July 12,
2012, 6:56 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/median_starting_pay_
for_associates_is_no_longer_in_the_six_figures_figure_d/.
20. The existence of “scamblogs” dedicated to warning students away from law
schools marks a significant departure from the situation of just a few years ago,
when data concerning employment outcomes (among other things) was presented
to prospective students with little opportunity for independent analysis. See, e.g.,
INSIDE L. SCH. SCAM, http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013) (scamblog run by Paul Campos, a law professor at the University of
Colorado); THIRD TIER REALITY, http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013); see also, e.g., Matt Leichter, About, L. SCH. TUITION BUBBLE, http://
lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“The
Law School Tuition Bubble is technically not a law school scamblog, but after a
few months I found myself allied with them over many substantive issues.”).
21. See, e.g., Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, THE NEWSLETTER (Ass’n of Am.
L. Schs.), Apr. 2002, at 1 (listing techniques by which law schools “manipulate
the data on which rankings are based”); Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market
Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/arti
cle/SB119040786780835602.html?mod=WSJ_article_comments#articleTabs%3D
article (noting that “the majority of law-school graduates are suffering from a
supply-and-demand imbalance that’s suppressing pay and job growth” and that
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employment market and rising tuition may have increased the pain
caused to students by these tactics—and perhaps increased the perva-
siveness of dishonesty—while concurrently making it more difficult
for those of us in the legal academy to ignore the wrongdoing in our
midst.22
This Article will show that although Pless and Sargent acted with
unusual mendacity, misrepresentation in law school marketing is by
no means unique to a few bad actors at a handful of law schools.  Part
II describes many ways in which law school officials have used deceit
and misrepresentation, along with misleading statistics, to market le-
gal education.  In addition to highlighting examples of particularly
egregious marketing, it depicts how the common presentation of em-
ployment statistics on law school webpages and elsewhere tends to
mislead readers.  Part III discusses ethical rules governing lawyers
and explains how law school officials have violated these rules, partic-
ularly prohibitions on engaging in misrepresentation, dishonesty, and
deceit.  It also discusses how bar discipline could encourage better be-
havior by law school officials and why this strategy might be more
effective than other tactics that have been proposed, such as class-
action litigation and criminal prosecution.  Part IV then offers some
suggestions for reform, including potential amendments to existing
ethical rules and invigorated oversight by entities such as the ABA
and the Association of American Law Schools.
II. LAW SCHOOLS HAVE USED DISHONEST MARKETING
In their efforts to maintain enrollment, law school officials have
engaged in deceit and misrepresentation.23  Beyond the brazen false-
“debate is intensifying among law-school academics over the integrity of law
schools’ marketing campaigns”); see also R. Lawrence Dessem, U.S. News U.: or,
The Fighting Volunteer Hurricanes, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 468, 468 (2002) (stating
that law schools have “misrepresented data” and “done other bad and stupid
things”).
22. Several New York Times articles have painted a highly negative picture of law
schools and their treatment of students. See, e.g., David Segal, Law Students
Lose the Grant Game as Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-grants.html?_r=5&hp=&pagewant
ed=all&.  Segal’s articles have drawn sharp criticism from legal academics, in-
cluding some who have identified important mistakes.  Regardless, their very
publication serves to discourage matriculation and to draw attention to genuine
bad behavior at law schools. E.g., Letter from Charles Grassley, U.S. Senator
and Ranking Member of Comm. on the Judiciary, to Stephen N. Zack, President
of Am. Bar Ass’n (July 11, 2011), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/
about/upload/2011-07-11-Grassley-to-ABA.pdf (quoting Segal article and expres-
sing concern that “millions of federally guaranteed taxpayer dollars are being
borrowed at the great risk that many students may not be able to pay off their
loans”).
23. Again, the phenomena described here did not arise with the present recession.
See, e.g., Disturbing Discrepancies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 20, 1995, at
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hoods at Illinois and Villanova described above,24 some law schools
have issued highly misleading advertising, communications that are
especially objectionable coming from institutions of higher learning.
Further, misleading statistics have pervaded the business-as-usual
reporting by law schools of their graduates’ employment outcomes and
salaries, which is among the most important information for prospec-
tive applicants deciding whether and where to attend law school.
A. Brazen Falsehoods
In a discussion of misleading marketing, it is perhaps easiest to
begin with bald-faced lies.  Students in the University of Illinois’s
graduating class of 2014 had a median undergraduate GPA of 3.70
and a median LSAT of 163.25  After Assistant Dean Paul Pless falsi-
fied certain records, the law school reported a median GPA of 3.81 and
a median LSAT of 168.26  Illinois accepted Pless’s resignation soon af-
ter his deceit came to light.27  At Villanova, the ABA censured the law
school for knowingly falsifying admissions data and concluded that
Dean Mark Sargent had directed the misreporting.28  Sargent had al-
ready resigned when his deceit became known; Villanova fired three
other employees who had participated in the fraud.29  Few if any legal
academics will defend the actions of Pless and Sargent.  Nonetheless,
it might be useful for law teachers to acknowledge the simple truth
that Pless and Sargent have violated the minimum standards of the
legal profession.30  We might then go one step further, acknowledging
that those of us with knowledge of such conduct—particularly those
82; Elizabeth Amon, How Many Teachers? Survey by U.S. News at Odds with
ABA’s, NAT’L L.J., May 31, 1999, at A12.
24. See supra Part I.
25. See ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 81.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1.  I take no position on the accuracy of the Illinois Report.  Among
other things, I cannot know whether anyone else participated in the deceit for
which Pless has received nearly all blame.
28. See Jeff Blumenthal, American Bar Association Censures Villanova Law, PHILA.
BUS. J. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2011/08/
15/american-bar-association-censures.html?page=all.
29. See id.  One of the three other employees was a tenured professor. See Letter
from Susan Westerberg Prager, Exec. Director, Assoc. Am. Law Schs., to Rev.
Peter M. Donohue, President, Villanova Univ., and John Y. Gotanda, Dean, Villa-
nova Univ. 2 (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www.law.villanova.edu/About%
20VLS/AALS%20Executive%20Committee%20Decision.aspx.
30. The ABA said as much about Sargent and Pless.  It described Villanova’s conduct
as “reprehensible and damaging to prospective law school applicants, law stu-
dents, law schools and the legal profession.  The conduct of the law school under-
mines confidence in the accreditation process.” VILLANOVA CENSURE, supra note
10; COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR
ASS’N, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW CENSURE 3 (2012) [hereinafter
ILLINOIS CENSURE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
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with first-hand knowledge—should report the malefactors to profes-
sional disciplinary bodies for the good of the profession.31  Perhaps
once we accept our duty to report “bad apples” like Pless and Sargent,
we will more readily confront the more subtle and widespread phe-
nomenon of misleading marketing.32  As is true in so many contexts,
admitting the existence of a problem is a necessary (but insufficient)
condition for solving the problem.
When estimating the scope of the problem, legal academics should
realize Villanova and Illinois almost certainly are not the only two
American law schools to have intentionally submitted false data.  Vil-
lanova and Illinois were not caught by the ABA or U.S. News; they
turned themselves in.  What are the odds these two schools are the
only ones with deceitful employees?  Undergraduate colleges have ad-
mitted to lying about the SAT scores of incoming students to boost
U.S. News rankings.33  The engineering school at the University of
Southern California was caught inflating the number of full-time, ten-
ure-track professors who were members of the National Academy of
Engineering.34  USC was caught not by U.S. News, which takes insti-
tutions at their word about such matters, but by a graduate student
whose message board post on College Confidential was read by an en-
terprising reporter.35  The University of Florida, whose business
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and
_resolutions/2012_june_u_illinois_public_censure.authcheckdam.pdf.
31. The specific rules violated by dishonest law school marketing are discussed below
in Part III.
32. For a discussion of who might already be required to report misconduct under
existing rules of professional conduct, see infra notes 207–35 and accompanying
text.
33. See Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a & Daniel E. Slotnik, Gaming the College Rankings,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A14 (“In one recent example, Iona Col-
lege . . . acknowledged last fall that its employees had lied for years not only
about test scores, but also about graduation rates, freshman retention, student-
faculty ratio, acceptance rates and alumni giving. . . . Claremont McKenna, part
of the Claremont Colleges cluster outside Los Angeles, acknowledged . . . that a
senior officer had resigned after admitting that he had inflated the average SAT
scores given to U.S. News since 2005.”).  Claremont McKenna President Pamela
B. Gann “said the college does not think more than one person was involved.”
Larry Gordon, Claremont McKenna College Inflated Freshman SAT Scores, Probe
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/30/local/la-
me-sat-20120131.  Had Gann been involved personally, she might have been sub-
ject to professional discipline because she—a former law dean at Duke—is a law-
yer licensed to practice in North Carolina. See Member Information: Ms. Pamela
B. Gann, N.C. ST. B., http://www.ncbar.gov/gxweb/viewmember.aspx?6262 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2013).
34. See Bob Morse, University of Southern California and the Engineering Rankings,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 11, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/college-rankings-blog/2009/06/11/university-of-southern-california-and-the-
engineering-rankings (school reported 30 but number was actually 13).
35. See Scott Jaschik, More Rankings Rigging, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 8, 2009, 3:00
AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/06/08/usc.  The College Confiden-
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school reported false job placement data about graduates, corrected its
data after an anonymous tipster called the university’s ethics hot-
line.36  And school districts across the country have been caught falsi-
fying primary and secondary student test scores.37  Law schools
largely police themselves.  Illinois and Villanova cheated for years
before admitting their misconduct.  Chances are cheating has gone un-
detected elsewhere.38
B. Highly-Misleading Pitches
Chastened by the knowledge that we indeed have a problem, we
can turn from the simple cases of outright lies to the more nuanced
problem of misleading communications.  In May 2012, the law school
at Rutgers-Camden contacted prospective students by e-mail, encour-
aging them to apply and announcing that the normal application fee
tial post, by Sam Lee, is available online.  Sam Lee, Comment to 2010 USNEWS
Graduate School Rankings, COLL. CONFIDENTIAL (Apr. 24, 2009, 11:47 AM), http:/
/talk.collegeconfidential.com/college-search-selection/701078-2010-usnews-gradu
ate-school-rankings.html.
36. See ANGEL KWOLEK-FOLLAND, REPORT #114214976 – UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
(Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/blogs/mba_
admissions/investigation%20report.pdf; Nathan Crabbe, UF’s MBA Data Given
to U.S. News Was Inaccurate, GAINESVILLE SUN (June 7, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://
www.gainesville.com/article/20110607/ARTICLES/110609584?p=all&tc=pgall.
37. See Emma Brown, Probe Finds Test Cheating at Several D.C. Schools, WASH.
POST (June 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/probe-
finds-test-cheating-at-several-dc-schools/2012/06/22/gJQAD4UXvV_story.html
(“D.C. test scores have come under increasing scrutiny since USA Today pub-
lished a March 2011 investigation showing an unusually high number of erasures
from wrong to right answers in more than 100 D.C. public schools between 2006
and 2010.”); Bill Bush & Catherine Candisky, State Will Look for Signs of Cheat-
ing in School District Data, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 26, 2012), http://www.
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/07/26/districts-officials-may-face-criminal
-charges.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter (“As a third Ohio school
district faced allegations of rigging its state report-card numbers, the Ohio
schools superintendent said yesterday that he will press for criminal charges
against educators who commit fraud.”); John Perry et al., Cheating Our Children:
Suspicious School Test Scores Across the Nation, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITU-
TION (Mar. 25, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/cheating-our-
children-suspicious-school-test-sco-1/nQSTS/ (“Suspicious test scores in roughly
200 school districts resemble those that entangled Atlanta in the biggest cheating
scandal in American history . . . .”).
38. See Bob Morse, U.S. News Urges Law School Deans to Improve Employment
Data, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/educa
tion/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2011/03/09/us-news-urges-law-school-deans-to-
improve-employment-data (quoting a letter from Brian Kelly to law school deans
as saying, “The entire law school sector is perceived to be less than can-
did. . . .  [I]t appears that some schools do not treat the ABA reporting rules with
the seriousness one would assume.”).  For those faculty members who disagree, I
urge the following test.  Ask the head of admissions at your school, “Do you think
other schools have lied about their admission stats like Illinois and Villanova?”
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would be waived.39  Admitted students could begin law school in just
three months.40  The letter was attacked almost immediately by com-
mentators who accused Rutgers-Camden of disseminating misleading
information about the employment outcomes of its graduates.41  How
did an e-mail message advertising a fee waiver draw so much criti-
cism?  The answer requires a careful analysis of employment and sal-
ary statistics and the ways such data can mislead unless presented in
proper context.
One of the statements drawing particular ire stated:  “Our average
starting salary for a 2011 graduate who enters private practice is in
excess of $74,000, with many top students accepting positions with
firms paying in excess of $130,000.”42  One problem with the $74,000
figure is that Rutgers-Camden does not actually know the average sal-
ary of its 2011 graduates; instead, it knows the average salary of those
graduates who responded to a survey question.  As it happens,
Rutgers has posted some information about its 2011 class online,43
allowing a careful comparison of the marketing e-mail and the under-
lying data.  It turns out that Rutgers-Camden graduated 242 students
in 2011,44 and 58 graduates reported being employed in private prac-
39. See Elie Mystal, Law School Sales Pitch Doubles Down on the ‘Getting Rich’ Ra-
tionale for Law School, ABOVE L. (May 18, 2002, 4:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.
com/2012/05/law-school-sales-pitch-doubles-down-on-the-getting-rich-rationale-
for-law-school/ (reprinting e-mail in its entirety).  The solicitation was innovative
because instead of contacting LSAT takers or others who had somehow indicated
an interest in attending law school, Rutgers-Camden contacted takers of the
Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), a test commonly taken by busi-
ness school applicants. See id.
40. The message indicated that students with sufficiently good undergraduate GPAs
and GMAT performance could be admitted without taking the LSAT. See Paul
Campos, Rutgers-Camden Goes Old School, INSIDE L. SCH. SCAM (May 18, 2012,
6:15 PM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/05/rutgers-camden-
goes-old-school.html (quoting the message as saying, “The program is open to all
students who have completed their undergraduate education with a 3.3 GPA or
higher and scored in the 70th percentile or higher on any one core section of the
GMAT.”).
41. See, e.g., LST Calls for Dean’s Resignation and ABA Investigation, L. SCH. TRANS-
PARENCY (May 20, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2012/
05/lst-calls-for-deans-resignation-and-aba-investigation/; Campos, supra note 40;
DJM, Comment to Rutgers-Camden Goes Old School, INSIDE L. SCH. SCAM (May
19, 2012, 4:58 PM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/05/rutgers-
camden-goes-old-school.html (comment by Professor Deborah Jones Merritt of
Ohio State speculating that author of marketing e-mail had violated ethical
rules).
42. See Campos, supra note 40.
43. See Class of 2011 Employment Data, RUTGERS SCH. L.—CAMDEN, http://camlaw.
rutgers.edu/sites/camlaw/files/charts.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) [hereinafter
2011 Employment Data, RUTGERS—CAMDEN].
44. See id. at 1–2 (reporting a total of 199 students employed nine months after grad-
uation and that “84.32%” of the class was employed at that time).  Those numbers
yield a class size of 236.  Note, however, that six students did not report their
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tice nine months after graduation.45  Of those 58 graduates, 27 re-
ported their salaries.46  Accordingly, the $74,000 figure is based on a
sample taken from less than half of the graduates in private practice,
and only about 11% of the class of 2011.
In addition, the law school’s own report indicates that the median
salary of those 27 graduates reporting a law firm salary was $60,000,
not $74,000.47  While it is possible that the $74,000 figure is the cor-
rect arithmetic mean, the published data do not allow an observer
outside the law school to be sure.  Further, using the mean instead of
the median when reporting salary data can be highly misleading be-
cause a small number of outliers can skew results.48  For example,
imagine a law school graduating class of 100, each of whom is hired
with a starting salary of $50,000.  The mean and median salary would
both be $50,000.49  If, however, one of the graduates suddenly has her
salary raised to $1 million, the mean salary for the class becomes
$59,500.50  The median remains the same.  A simpler illustration is
employment status and seem to have been left out of all calculations. See id. at 1.
Chances are that the inclusion of those six students would make the employment
data appear worse; if they had jobs, Rutgers-Camden may have been able to dis-
cover them.
45. Id. at 2.  The statement “[a]round 29% of 2011 graduates are working in law
firms” in the Rutgers-Camden 2011 Data, id. at 3, is not accurate.  The 58 gradu-
ates working at private firms represents about 29% of those graduates who are
employed at all, which is about 24% of the graduating class (and 25% of the 236
students counted in the Rutgers-Camden statistics).
46. Id. at 2.  Because graduates working for larger firms were more likely to report
salary data than were small-firm lawyers, the “average” reported by Rutgers-
Camden likely overstates the compensation of 2011 graduates in private practice.
See LST Calls for Dean’s Resignation and ABA Investigation, supra note 41.
47. See 2011 Employment Data, RUTGERS—CAMDEN, supra note 43, at 2.  The median
is the middle value in a list of numbers.
48. I do not intend to suggest that reporting a mean salary is never appropriate.
Depending on the data set, it is possible that a median might provide a less accu-
rate picture than the mean in certain circumstances.  That said, because of the
upward skew of law graduate salary data, schools are much more likely to have a
handful of high-salaried outliers in their data set than to have a handful of low-
salaried outliers.  Accordingly, reporting the mean alone will commonly overstate
the expected salary of graduates.  Here, it might have been useful for Rutgers-
Camden to report both figures.  For an example of how an outlier can affect mean
salary data, compare Martin J. Katz, “Why Now Is the Time to Apply to Denver
Law,” http://www.law.du.edu/index/php/admissions/learn/choosing-denver-law-
myths-v.-facts (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (stating that “at Denver Law, our 2011
graduates in the private sector had an average salary of $81,466”), with Class of
2011, U. DENVER STURM COL. L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/career-devel
opment-and-opportunities/employment-statistics/class-of-2011 (last visited Mar.
20, 2013) (showing that mean salary figure for private sector lawyers was based
on 73 salaries, including one of $350,000, and that the median reported private
sector salary was $75,000; if one excludes the outlier, the mean of the remaining
72 salaries would be $77,716).
49. Results like this are beyond the fantasies of most law schools in America.
50. The mean is calculated as follows: [(99 * $50,000) + ($1,000,000)] / 100 = $59,500.
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that when Bill Gates enters a room, the mean net worth of those pre-
sent goes way up even though no one has become richer.
Someone unfamiliar with the intricacies of law school employment
reporting might well believe the “average” 2011 graduate of Rutgers-
Camden had a salary of $74,000, at least for those graduates who
chose to enter private practice.  The data reveal, however, that this
calculation (1) ignores those graduates with no jobs at all, (2) includes
only the minority of law firm employees who chose to report a salary,
and (3) reports the apparent mean instead of the more useful median.
As Professor Campos noted, a more accurate summary of the salary
data would report that among Rutgers-Camden’s graduating class of
242 students, only 14 graduates reported a law firm salary equal to or
greater than $60,000.51
Further, Rutgers-Camden reported that of the 27 private lawyers
reporting a salary, the seventy-fifth percentile was $111,000.52  This
means that depending on rounding decisions, six or seven graduates
reported a salary greater than or equal to $111,000.  But the market-
ing e-mail stated that “many top students accept[ed] positions with
firms paying in excess of $130,000.”53  Law School Transparency, after
analyzing multiple sources of Rutgers-Camden’s employment data in
detail, estimated “just one graduate” earned in excess of $130,000 and
concluded that “Camden knows that at most five graduates reported a
salary of $130,000+, or 2.1% of the entire class.”54  Reasonable persons
can disagree about what number of “top” Rutgers-Camden graduates
constitutes “many,” but surely a number countable on one hand can-
not justify a claim that “many top students accept[ed] positions with
firms paying in excess of $130,000.”55
As will be addressed in the next subsection, the statistics com-
monly presented by law schools to prospective students have a ten-
dency to mislead by creating a falsely rosy picture of employment
outcomes.  The marketing e-mail took Rutgers-Camden’s already un-
duly cheery numbers and used them to create a highly misleading
sales pitch, which was then sent to prospective consumers unfamiliar
with law school reporting conventions.  Would a majority of recipients
51. See Campos, supra note 40.
52. See 2011 Employment Data, RUTGERS—CAMDEN, supra note 43, at 2.
53. See Campos, supra note 40.
54. LST Calls for Dean’s Resignation and ABA Investigation, supra note 41.  To be
fair, these small numbers likely understate the number of Rutgers-Camden grad-
uates who were offered such law firm jobs (as opposed to those who held them
nine months after graduation) because some top students decline law firm offers
to accept judicial clerkships.
55. When confronted with criticism, the law school administration said the market-
ing material was accurate.  See Group Seeks Resignation of Rutgers-Camden Law
Official, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 22, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.
com/quicktakes/2012/05/22/group-seeks-resignation-rutgers-camden-law-official.
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be misled by such a message?  Perhaps not.  Nonetheless, law profes-
sors should agree that the number of readers likely to be misled is
unacceptably high.
An “Employment FAQ” published on the New York Law School
(NYLS) website provides another example of how technically accurate
statistics can prove highly misleading.56  The document contains
statements like “Reports of salaries in business for recent graduates
have ranged from $50,000 to $150,000.”57  Those numbers track sala-
ries reported in another NYLS document, “New York Law School 2010
Employment Stats” (also available on the school’s website, and linked
to on the Employment FAQ), which reports the minimum and maxi-
mum salaries for graduates employed in “corporate/business” as
$50,000 and $150,000.58  Someone reading the Employment FAQ
could learn, if she clicked on a link to the NYLS website and found the
2010 Employment Stats, that the salary range reported for recent
graduates in “business” is based upon 10 survey respondents (out of
about 111 students working in “business” from a graduating class of
481).59  This statistic is especially misleading because law schools
count non-legal employment in the “corporate/business” category
(sometimes referred to as “business and industry”), meaning that
graduates unable to find legal jobs who work in retail, childcare, or
food service are counted as being employed in “business.”  One can
only imagine law graduates employed at Target and Starbucks—in
the sort of jobs they might have taken had they not attended law
school—are those least likely to report their salaries to career services
surveyors.60  Chances are the overwhelming majority of graduates in
the “corporate/business” category earn less than $50,000.
56. See Employment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/1/3/4/794/
ADMSEmploymentFAQ2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Employ-
ment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH.] (cached copy on file with author).  Professors Campos
and Merritt were the first to publically analyze this document. See Paul Campos,
Mistaken Beliefs About the Crisis of the American Law School: If You Sue a Law
School, It Will Stop Publishing Fraudulent Employment Data, INSIDE L. SCH.
SCAM (Apr. 25, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/
04/mistaken-beliefs-about-crisis-of_25.html.
57. Employment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH., supra note 56, at 1.
58. New York Law School 2010 Employment Stats, N.Y.L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/
user_files/1/3/4/167/CSRS%20Employment%20Stats%20for%20Web%200511%20
v1-rev.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) [hereinafter NYLS 2010 Stats].
59. See id. at 1.  The figure of 111 students comes from the 27.3% of employed gradu-
ates listed in “Corporate/Business” (out of 407 employed graduates).
60. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & JDS 2010, at 15–18, 112–13 (2011)
[hereinafter NALP, JOBS & JDS] (discussing how national salary data is up-
wardly skewed by non-random sample); NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, CLASS
OF 2011 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2012) [hereinafter NALP, 2011 SUMMARY
REPORT], available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011
.pdf (including salary data from 2,661 out of 2,865 graduates at firms employing
500+ lawyers, but only 3,081 out of 7,570 graduates at firms with 2-to-10 law-
2013] LAW SCHOOL MARKETING AND LEGAL ETHICS 879
Similarly, the Employment FAQ discussed NYLS graduates work-
ing at “smaller firms” and reports: “Based on the data we do have, we
estimate that the salary range is $40,000 to $80,000.”61  Firms of two-
to-ten lawyers employed 57.6% of all 2010 NYLS graduates working
for private law firms (with 42.5% of employed graduates working for a
firm of any size), making the salary of small firm lawyers particularly
important in evaluating the expected return of a NYLS degree.62  The
2010 Employment Stats reveal, however, that this important datum is
based on the reported salaries of 16 small-firm lawyers (of the 98
graduates working at such firms).63  In addition, the highest salary
reported by a graduate working at a firm of ten lawyers or fewer was
$75,000.64  The $80,000 figure likely comes from someone employed at
a slightly larger “smaller firm.”65  Even the bottom figure, $40,000,
probably substantially overstates the salaries of many graduates
working in firms of two-to-ten lawyers.66  The category counts part-
time and temporary positions (and part-time, temporary positions), as
well as “eat-what-you-kill” arrangements in which a firm allows a re-
yers); TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 146–54 (providing further evidence of skew).
The skew upward is further exacerbated because schools can enter salaries for
non-reporting grads when publically known, and such data are known far more
often for large firms, which happen to have the highest salaries. See NAT’L ASS’N
FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR MANAGING LAW SCHOOL
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES 3 (2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/lse
otf_guide_final.pdf (listing sources of “third-party provided” information for em-
ployment and salary data, including internet searches).  Although the “Employ-
ment FAQ” page does advise that the “salary range for law graduates varies
greatly,” Employment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH., supra note 56, at 1, it does not disclose
that the data collected by law schools tend to substantially oversample higher
salaries among graduates with full-time positions, nor does it mention the com-
plete exclusion of salaries from part-time workers.
61. Employment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH., supra note 56, at 1.  Although the document
states that it is “difficult to report definitive information on starting salaries in
smaller firms because the information is not public,” see id., there is no mention
of the skewed sample or the exclusion of part-time lawyers.
62. See NYLS 2010 Stats, supra note 58, at 1–2.  The combination of these numbers
reveals that about 24% of all employed 2010 NYLS graduates were at firms with
2–10 lawyers.  That represents 98 members of the class of 481; recall that the
NYLS stats count only the 407 graduates who are employed at all.
63. See id. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Firms with between 11 and 500 lawyers are divided into five categories in the
NYLS 2010 Stats. See id. at 2.  All such firms combined to employ about 24.5% of
the 2010 NYLS graduates working at private firms (that is, less than half of the
number of graduates at firms with two-to-ten lawyers). See id.
66. The NYLS 2010 Stats note that the lowest reported small-firm (two to ten law-
yers) full-time salary was $35,000, see id., which is below the $40,000 figure re-
ported in the Employment FAQ as the bottom of the “salary range” for smaller
firms.
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cent graduate to associate with established lawyers without providing
a salary.67
The Employment FAQ then discusses how many graduates change
jobs frequently during their first years of practice and presents the
results of a “recent study” of NYLS graduates two-to-four years out of
law school:
A recent study of New York Law School alumni who graduated between two
and four years ago showed their salary increases in their second and third
jobs.  First salaries in the $40,000 to $60,000 range were the most common (46
percent), but that shifted with the graduates’ second and third jobs to the
least common (20 percent).  At the same time, salaries in the $60,000 to
$90,000 range grew from 22.5 percent to 35.5 percent.  Salaries in the range
above $90,000 grew from 26 percent to 40 percent.  All of these job changes
occurred within four years of graduation.68
A reader of the above paragraph and its accompanying graph
might reasonably draw the following inferences:  First, about 95% of
NYLS graduates earn at least $40,000 per year in their first job.69
Second, more than one-fourth of NYLS graduates begin work with a
starting salary above $90,000.70  Third, the percentage of NYLS grad-
uates earning above $90,000 annually increases in just a few years to
40%.71
Those assumptions are likely false.  We know from the 2010 Em-
ployment Stats that NYLS has salary data for only 26% of employed
graduates (105 salaries), or 22% of the graduating class.72  Even if we
exclude the unemployed, it is difficult to see how 95% of the 407 grad-
uates NYLS counted as “employed” in its 2010 statistics could have
had an annual salary of at least $40,000.  These 407 graduates include
111 in “Corporate/Business” (of whom 10 reported a salary) and 98
graduates in firms with between two and ten lawyers (of whom 16
reported a salary).  If even 21 of these students (including those not
67. See Graduate Survey Form—Class of 2010 NALP Employment Report and Salary
Survey, NAT’L ASS’N L. PLACEMENT (2011), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/ERSS/
Gradsurvey_and_FAQs_2012.pdf (asking graduates to count themselves as em-
ployed if they have “a position for which [they] receive a salary or a stipend or are
being paid on a contract or retainer basis”); NALP, JOBS & JDS, supra note 60, at
29, 81 (reporting that 51.6% of graduates nationwide reporting full-time salaries
from firms with two-to-ten lawyers reported salaries of $50,000 or less and that
the median reported salary for graduates employed full-time at such firms in
New York was $50,000).  Like the Employment FAQ, the NYLS 2010 Stats pre-
sent salary data with no mention of the skewed sample or the exclusion of part-
time lawyers. NYLS 2010 Stats, supra note 58, at 1–2.
68. See Employment FAQ, N.Y.L. SCH., supra note 56, at 2.
69. The graph shows starting salaries of “$40,000 to $60,000” for 46%, of “$60,001 to
$90,000” for 23%, and “Over $90,000” for 26%. Id.  This yields a total of 95%
earning $40,000 or more.
70. The graph shows 26% earning above $90,000. Id.
71. The graph shows that in the “3rd Job,” the “Over $90,000” includes 40% of
alumni. Id.
72. See NYLS 2010 Stats, supra note 58, at 1.
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reporting salaries) earned below $40,000, then the 95% figure is
false.73  As for the second assumption, if we again exclude the unem-
ployed, NYLS must nonetheless produce more than 100 members of
the class of 2010 with salaries above $90,000 nine months after gradu-
ation; otherwise, it cannot justify a claim that 26% of alumni earned
“Over $90,000” in their first job.74  The 2010 Stats show that of all
graduates working in “Corporate/Business” or at law firms with more
than 100 lawyers, the total number who reported salaries was 37 or
fewer, and not all of these salaries exceeded $90,000.75  It is nearly
impossible to believe that more than 60 additional alumni from the
NYLS class of 2010 were earning above $90,000 nine months after
graduation without the school knowing.76  Finally, with respect to the
third assumption, if 40% of NYLS alumni have changed jobs and earn
more than $90,000 a few years after graduation, the legal employment
market must be vastly better than has been reported.77
The NYLS “study” is likely not the result of outright fabrication
like the statistics reported by Villanova and Illinois.  Instead, the
school hired a market research firm to conduct a survey of some of its
alumni, a survey whose validity cannot be assessed based on the infor-
mation presented in the Employment FAQ.78  The small number of
graduates who had changed jobs and reported salary data presented a
highly misleading picture of the employment prospects of most NYLS
73. Twenty-one graduates would be 5.2% of the 407 employed 2010 graduates.
74. To be precise, 26% of 407 employed graduates is 105.8 alumni.
75. The number includes 10 from “Corporate/Business,” 19 from firms with more
than 500 lawyers, and “<5” each from firms with 101–250 lawyers and 251–500
lawyers. See NYLS 2010 Stats, supra note 58, at 1–2.
76. NALP best practices allow schools to determine graduates’ employment status
(i.e., where they work) with internet searches and to use publically available sal-
ary data (if any) when employed graduates do not report salaries.  At firms pay-
ing more than $90,000 to new lawyers, associate salaries are generally publicly
known.  In other words, few graduates earn such salaries without their law
schools “knowing” for purposes of salary data collection. See supra note 60.
77. See, e.g., Christopher Danzig, DOJ Wants You, Experienced Attorneys—To Work
for Free, ABOVE L. (Jan. 26, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/01/the-
doj-wants-you-experienced-attorneys-to-work-for-free/ (reporting that U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office in Pennsylvania seeks “candidates [who] should possess at least five
years of post-J.D. legal experience” for unpaid, year-long position); see also supra
note 19 (noting the faltering market for attorneys entering the workforce).
78. Reasonable prospective applicants might well believe that when an academic in-
stitution touts a “study,” the work is reliable.  In response to an earlier draft of
this article, NYLS informed me that Hanover Research conducted the “study”
described in the Employment FAQ.  The school declined to provide a copy of the
Hanover report.  Hanover Research is a company that provides “strategy and
market research services” for clients. See About Us, HANOVER RES., http://www.
hanoverresearch.com/outsourced-research/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“By deliv-
ering timely, authoritative reports, our research professionals help clients lever-
age insights to stay abreast of trends, make informed decisions and increase their
return on investment.”).
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graduates.  After all, graduates with higher salaries are far more
likely to report them.79  This misleading picture was presented on a
graph and summarized in way that could lead prospective students to
wildly overestimate the expected compensation of NYLS alumni.80
C. Systematically-Bad Statistics
The previous section concerned marketing materials prepared by
law schools that tend to mislead readers about the employment pros-
pects of law graduates; careful analysis of underlying statistics pro-
vided context that undermined the optimistic marketing messages.
But a prospective law student who avoided all e-mail pitches and rosy
FAQ documents would not be safe in assuming the basic statistics col-
lected and presented by law schools are accurate.  Indeed, the mis-
leading nature of common legal employment statistics is perhaps a
bigger danger to prospective students than is the selective quotation
of those statistics in advertisements.  While a wary consumer may
suspect trickery in a glossy brochure or an unsolicited message offer-
ing a fee waiver, the dry statistics reported by academic institutions to
the ABA, the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), and
U.S. News possess an aura of credibility.  That credibility is
undeserved.
For years, law schools have reported statistics using an overbroad
definition of “employed” (causing prospective students to overestimate
the percentage of law graduates with the sort of jobs prospective stu-
dents hope to attain); masked the number of “employed” graduates
working for their own law schools in temporary jobs; released salary
data based on self-selected samples of the best-paid graduates; and
enticed students with opaque scholarship offers, causing prospective
students to overestimate the benefits being offered.  Misleading statis-
tics, which nearly always tend to improve the apparent value of legal
education, have been spread via third parties—such as the ABA,
NALP, and U.S. News—and directly by the law schools in websites,
brochures, and other advertising media.
79. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
80. Professor Merritt contacted NYLS in April seeking information about how the
study was conducted; NYLS never provided that information. See E-mail from
Deborah Merritt, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, to author (July 30,
2012, 10:27 PM) (on file with author); Campos, supra note 56.  As of August 5,
2012, the “Employment FAQ” page was linked from the “Consumer Information”
page of the NYLS webpage, located at http://www.nyls.edu/prospective_students/
consumer_information.  As of December 21, 2012, it was no longer linked from
that page.
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1. The Broad Definition of “Employed”
The obfuscation of employment statistics begins with the question
of who counts as “employed.”  In general, law school statistics count as
“employed” graduates whose employment outcomes are far from what
most law students would consider successful.  For example, schools for
years commonly reported the percentage of students who were “em-
ployed” with no qualifications concerning (a) whether a job is part-
time or full-time, (b) whether a job is temporary or permanent, or (c)
whether a job is legal or non-legal (that is, whether the graduate has a
job requiring bar admission).81  Accordingly, a student could count as
“employed” while holding a part-time, non-legal temporary job (such
as a twenty-hour-per-week, temporary, secretarial position).82  This
phenomenon continues today.  The Rutgers-Camden statistics dis-
cussed above are representative of what law schools have dissemi-
nated for years.83  An eight-page document on the law school website
titled “Class of 2011 Employment Data” begins by stating that 84.32%
of the Rutgers-Camden class of 2011 was employed nine months after
graduation.84  There is a chart titled “Level of Education Required”
showing which jobs count as “Bar Admission Required,” “JD Advan-
tage,” “Other professional degree,” and “Professional degree not re-
quired.”85  Another two charts divide jobs between “Part-time” and
“Full-time,” and between “Short-term” and “Long-term.”86
81. The statistics generally measure employment at graduation and, more impor-
tantly, nine months afterward. See, e.g., Admissions Bulletin, U. S.C. SCH. L. 6,
http://law.sc.edu/admissions/bulletin/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (cached copy on
file with author) (stating, in bulletin aimed at prospective students, “Approxi-
mately 95 percent of graduates are employed within nine months of gradua-
tion.”); 2011–2012 Admission Statistics, SMU DEDMAN SCH. L., http://www.law.
smu.edu/getattachment/e3f30e9e-0cff-4c8a-a94a-cbf33e7e095b/quickfacts.pdf.asp
x?chset=d2f1c79e-498e-4f5c-84d5-495e2099922f (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (“Ap-
proximately 95.06% of the class of 2010 was employed 6 to 9 months after gradu-
ation.”); see also NYLS 2010 Stats, supra note 58.  The statistics presented for the
NYLS class of 2011 are substantially more comprehensive. See New York Law
School 2011 Employment Statistics, N.Y.L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/
1/3/4/21/CSRS%20Employment%20Stats%20for%20Web%200511%20v1-rev.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter NYLS 2011 Stats] (showing which jobs
are part-time, which are full-time, which are temporary, and which are perma-
nent, and also listing how many graduates are in jobs that require a law degree,
among other data).
82. See Methodology for Calculating Graduate Employment Rate, NAT’L ASS’N L.
PLACEMENT, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Employment_Rate_Calc.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2013) (“A graduate who has a job as of February 15 is employed.
The job may be full-time, part-time, temporary, permanent, law-related or not.”).
83. See 2011 Employment Data, RUTGERS—CAMDEN, supra note 43 (discussing em-
ployment statistics which were sent by e-mail to GMAT takers).
84. Id. at 1.
85. Id. at 5.  “JD Advantage” is not defined.
86. Id.
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These three charts are misleading because, on each of them, the
numbers sum to 100%, meaning unemployed graduates are omitted
from the calculations.  Accordingly, it is not true (as a graph implies)
that 90.45% of Rutgers-Camden 2011 graduates have full-time jobs; in
truth it is  90.45% of employed students (only 84.32% of the class was
employed) with full-time jobs—about 76% of the overall class.  Simi-
larly, it is not true (as a graph implies) that 91.46% of Rutgers-Cam-
den 2011 graduates have long-term jobs; more correctly, 91.46% of the
84.32% of graduates with any jobs had long-term jobs—about 77% of
the overall class.  In addition, nowhere in the document can one find
the percentage of graduates working full-time in long-term jobs for
which bar admission is required.87  Further, it is not true (as a graph
implies) that 77.39% of Rutgers-Camden 2011 graduates have jobs of
some kind that require bar admission (some of which are likely tempo-
rary jobs in the document review mines, others of which are part-time,
and some of which are both temporary and part-time).  Instead, the
correct figure is 77.39% of the 84.32% of the class employed at all—
about 65%—has some kind of job requiring bar admission.  When one
excludes part-time and short-term workers, the percentage drops to
58.3.88  These statistics are far less encouraging than the 84% employ-
ment figure touted at the top of the document.
I should stress that Rutgers-Camden is no outlier.  Law schools
across the United States have released misleadingly rosy statistics for
years.  For example, on Santa Clara Law’s webpage, the “Legal Em-
ployment Statistics” page begins with a discussion headed, “Employ-
ment Status for the Class of 2010.”89  The bar graph in that section
reports that of 306 total graduates, 78% were employed nine months
after graduation.90  Near the bottom of the page, under “Other Em-
ployment Information,” one can find three charts showing the kinds of
jobs obtained by Santa Clara graduates.91  One distinguishes part-
time jobs from full-time jobs, a second separates permanent and tem-
porary jobs, and the third displays the “Education Required for Posi-
tion.”92  All three ignore unemployed students entirely.93  No chart
shows the percentage of graduates in full-time, permanent jobs for
87. Although the number is not presented by the law school in its summary, Rutgers-
Camden did submit it to the ABA.  According to ABA data, 141 graduates (out of
the class of 242) had full-time, long-term, “bar passage required” jobs. SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT SUM-
MARY FOR 2011 GRADUATES: RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN (2012), available at
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/.
88. See id.
89. Legal Employment Statistics, SANTA CLARA L., http://law.scu.edu/careers/employ
ment-data-2010.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Legal Employment
Statistics, SANTA CLARA L.].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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which legal training is required.  Also, even though 239 of the Santa
Clara class of 2010 graduates are reported as employed,94 these three
charts are based on far smaller data sets.  While 200 graduates re-
ported the level of education required for their jobs, only 65 reported
whether their jobs were temporary or permanent, and only 62 re-
ported whether they had part-time or full-time work.95  Without ac-
counting for sample bias, these statistics show that about 63% of
Santa Clara’s 2010 graduates reported being employed as lawyers.96
Because students with better employment outcomes are far more
likely to provide detailed reports of their employment status,97 the
figures on these charts are both highly unreliable and almost certainly
overly optimistic.98  Santa Clara deserves credit for providing the
sample size for its graphs, allowing a careful reader to realize the re-
sults presented are of such little value.  Nonetheless, the low value of
the statistics is problematic despite the ability of statisticians to dis-
cern flaws.
At Gonzaga University School of Law, a “Prospective Students”
page had a pie chart titled, “Where Our Graduates Work: Class of
2009.”99  The chart divided graduates into categories such as “private
practice,” “business,” and “government.”100  It took no account of un-
employed students—the totals summed to 99%, presumably because
of rounding—nor did it explain that certain jobs are likely part-time,
temporary, and non-legal.  There was also no explanation for the use
of class of 2009 statistics in autumn 2012.101
93. Two sum to 100%.  The other, presumably because of rounding, sums to 101%.
See id.
94. That is, 78% of 306 is 238.7.
95. See Legal Employment Statistics, SANTA CLARA L., supra note 89.
96. See id. (showing 78% of all graduates are employed, with 81% of those jobs being
“JD required”).
97. See infra subsection II.C.3 (discussing the tendency of high-salaried graduates to
respond to the surveys at higher rates than low-salaried graduates).
98. The overly rosy figures are: 82% of employed graduates are in permanent posi-
tions, 89% of employed graduates have full-time jobs, and 81% of employed grad-
uates have jobs requiring a J.D. Legal Employment Statistics, SANTA CLARA L.,
supra note 89.
99. Prospective Students, GONZ. U. SCH. L., http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/Career+
Services/prospective_students.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (cached copy on file
with author).
100. Id.
101. See id.  Under the newly revised ABA Standard 509, fresher data will now be
required. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2012–2013, Approval Standard No. 509(a) (2012) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013].  After reviewing an earlier draft of this
article, the law school informed me that the “Prospective Students” page de-
scribed above “was an archived web page that remained available only for histori-
cal purposes and accessible only via a search results page, rather than through
our official website navigation.”  E-mail from John D. Sklut, Assistant Dean of
Students, Gonzaga Univ. Sch. of Law to author (Nov. 9, 2012, 11:17 AM) (on file
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At Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School, a “Quick Facts” webpage
reports “Placement Rates for 2011 Graduates” as 84.1%.102  It then
states that of 132 graduates, 111 were “known to be employed.”103  No
information is provided concerning how many jobs are long-term or
short-term, how many are full-time or part-time, or how many require
bar admission.  From data submitted to the ABA, one can learn that
only 54 of the 132 graduates in Atlanta’s John Marshall’s class of 2011
(40.9%) had full-time, long-term jobs for which bar passage was
required.104
The data reported by Thomas M. Cooley School of Law reveal an-
other potential flaw in the ABA’s data collection.  Cooley states in its
online employment statistics, “The ABA advised schools to determine
and report every graduate’s full-time/long- or short-term and part-
time/long- or short-term employment status, even if a graduate did
not voluntarily supply complete information.”105  Because Cooley
lacked information about whether certain employed graduates were in
short-term or long-term jobs, as well as about whether they held part-
time or full-time jobs, Cooley proposed to the ABA that the school
would report these statuses as “unknown.”106  The ABA form allowed
schools to report a graduate’s employment status as entirely unknown
(if a school had no idea whether someone was working at all), but it
did not provide an “unknown” option for the short-term/long-term or
full-time/part-time statuses of graduates with jobs.107  The ABA de-
clined to create the new “unknown” options for employed graduates,
instructing Cooley, “Do everything you can to contact [the graduates]
and confirm the status.”108  For those graduates whose statuses re-
with author).  Further, more current data were available on the career services
webpage during autumn 2012, and as of Nov. 5, 2012, the archived page was
removed from the Gonzaga website. Id.
102. Quick Facts, ATLANTA’S J. MARSHALL L. SCH., http://www.johnmarshall.edu/
futurestudent/admissions-aid/quick-facts/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
103. Id.
104. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR. ASS’N, EMPLOY-
MENT SUMMARY FOR 2011 GRADUATES: ATLANTA’S JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL
(2012), available at http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/.
105. Class of 2011 Employment Statistics, T.M. COOLEY SCH. L. (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.cooley.edu/consumerinformation/_docs/2011_Graduate_Employment_
Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Employment Stats, T.M. COOLEY SCH. L.].
106. See E-mail from Laura E. LeDuc, Assistant Dean of Planning, Programs, & As-
sessment, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., to Kenneth Williams, Data Specialist,
Am. Bar Ass’n (Mar. 6, 2012, 11:21 AM) (on file with author).
107. Id.
108. See E-mail from Kenneth Williams, Data Specialist, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Laura E.
LeDuc, Assistant Dean of Planning, Programs, & Assessment, Thomas M. Cooley
Law Sch. (Mar. 6, 2012, 12:24 PM) (on file with author).  Williams added, “Use
secondary sources as much as possible to confirm the status.  Finally, make a
decision based on your best judgment.  Document your reasoning for that judg-
ment as related to the particular graduate.” Id.
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mained unknown after further investigation by the school, Cooley
stated that “the default classification for those lacking complete data
was full-time/long-term unless Cooley had evidence to contradict that
classification.”109  In other words, if a potential Cooley student re-
views the law school’s placement statistics as reported to the ABA
(whether on the ABA website or as part of rankings based on the ABA
data), the number of reported full-time, long-term jobs may include
some number of part-time, short-term jobs.110
2. Statistics-Enhancing Jobs at Law Schools
In addition to masking the prevalence of underemployed gradu-
ates—those who are working but lack full-time, long-term, legal
jobs—the definition of “employed” conceals the common practice of law
schools employing their own graduates.  With names like “Entry Into
Practice”111 and “Postgraduate Fellowship Program,”112 programs at
many law schools pay recent graduates to provide free work for ap-
proved employers, often in public interest jobs.113  Graduates in such
109. 2011 Employment Stats, T.M. COOLEY SCH. L., supra note 105.  Cooley adopted
this “default classification” even though some of the students who did report their
employment status in detail did not report full-time/long-term employment. See
id.
110. The number is not likely to be large.  Cooley stated that after “exhaustive re-
search,” the school was “able to determine with reasonable certainty the full-/
part-time and long-/short-term status of all but perhaps a dozen of our 583 em-
ployed graduates.” See Letter from James B. Thelen, Assoc. Dean for Legal Af-
fairs and General Counsel, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. to author 2 (Nov. 7, 2012)
(on file with author).  For a description of Cooley’s research, see Consumer Infor-
mation, T.M. COOLEY SCH. L., http://www.cooley.edu/consumerinformation/#
employment (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“For graduates who did not respond to
the NALP survey, Cooley determined and confirmed a graduate’s employment
status from publicly available sources such as state bar records, social media
(e.g., LinkedIn, Facebook), law firm or business web sites, and other internet re-
sources. Cooley also obtained employment information about some graduates
from faculty members and classmates.”).
111. Employment Data for 2011 Graduates, GEO. L. 3, http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/careers/career-planning/upload/class-of-2011-graduate-statistics.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2013).
112. 2010 Employment Report, EMORY L., http://www.law.emory.edu/career-services/
for-prospective-students/employment-statistics/2010-employment-statistics.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
113. See Karen Sloan, Data Trove Reveals Scope of Law Schools’ Hiring of Their Own
Graduates, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
jsp?id=1202549157393&Data_trove_reveals_scope_of_law_schools_hiring_of_
their_own_graduates_ [hereinafter Sloan, Data Trove] (subscription required).
Not all school-funded jobs are in public interest positions. See, e.g., Karen Sloan,
Paying the Price for Law Firm Employment, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 28, 2011, at 11
(“SMU unveiled its Test Drive program, in which the school pays employers
$3,500 to take in recent graduates for one or two months.”).
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programs are then counted as “employed” in employment statistics.114
For example, the University of Virginia School of Law reported that
98% of the class of 2010 was employed nine months after graduation,
Vanderbilt University Law School reported 92%, and Washington &
Lee University School of Law reported 90%.115  At all three schools,
however, 11% of graduates from 2010 were employed by the schools
themselves.116  These percentages are high but not unique; 9% of
ABA-accredited law schools reported that they hired between 11% and
15% of their 2010 graduates.117
The 2011 statistics from UCLA School of Law illustrate the effects
of school-funded employment on statistics already obfuscated by a
loose definition of “employed.”  UCLA’s “Employment Data” webpage
reports that the class of 2011 had 344 graduates, and 91.6% of the
class was “employed at nine months out.”118  Of the employed gradu-
ates, 92.4% have jobs for which bar admission is anticipated or re-
quired, meaning 84.6% of UCLA graduates had jobs as lawyers.119
Further down the page, however, one learns that 64 graduates (22% of
the entire class) were in positions funded by UCLA itself.120  If all of
114. Counting such graduates as “employed” can be particularly misleading because
(1) school-funded jobs often disappear soon after the nine-month reporting period,
and (2) some schools have recently extended the length of their program to one
year, just enough to count as “long-term” employment.
115. See Sloan, Data Trove, supra note 113.
116. See id.  The graduates employed by the schools are counted as employed; other-
wise, the total employment rate at all three of these schools would exceed 100%
for the class of 2010.  I do not mean to suggest that any of the three schools con-
cealed programs through which they funded employment of their own graduates.
Indeed, schools advertised these programs to prospective students, see, e.g., On-
Campus Interviews, Employment and Judicial Clerkships: 2012 Edition, VAND.
U. L. SCH. 20, http://law.vanderbilt.edu/employers-cs/download.aspx?id=7765
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013) (“To assist new graduates during the downturn, VLS
launched the Public Service Initiative (PSI) in 2009, providing stipends to new
graduates who secure legal internships in public service or with non-profit advo-
cacy organizations.”), and the number of graduates participating was reported to
the ABA.  Nonetheless, the headline “employed” figures are widely reported,
often without context.
117. See Sloan, Data Trove, supra note 113.  Additionally, 11% of schools reported hir-
ing 6-to-10% of their graduates, 48% reported hiring 1-to-5%, and 27% reported
hiring none. Id.
118. Employment Data, UCLA SCH. L., http://www.law.ucla.edu/career-services/Pages
/employment-statistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2012) (cached copy on file with
author).
119. See id.  Another 5.1% were listed under “JD Advantage.” Id.  Of the 291 gradu-
ates employed in jobs requiring bar passage, only 211 had full-time, long-term
employment. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR.
ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2011 GRADUATES: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—
LOS ANGELES (2012), available at http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.
org/ [hereinafter UCLA 2011 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY] (allowing users to generate
reports of data by school for classes of 2010 and 2011).
120. See Employment Data, UCLA SCH. L., supra note 118.
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those 64 graduates are among those counted as working as law-
yers,121 the percentage of UCLA’s 2011 graduating class working in
legal jobs not funded by the school drops to 66%.  Suddenly, what
seemed like a 92% employment rate appears much different.
Similarly, at Boston University School of Law (BU), 238 of the 273
members of the class of 2011 (87.2% of graduates) were reported as
employed nine months after graduation.122  However, one-fourth of all
employed BU graduates (22% of all graduates) were in jobs funded by
the university.123  In other words, only about 65% of the graduating
class held jobs of any kind—including part-time gigs, temporary jobs,
and non-legal positions—that BU was not funding.
Until recently, one could not even calculate the effect of school-
funded jobs on law school employment statistics because the schools
did not disclose such employment.  The availability of these figures is
therefore an improvement.  Many prospective students, however, will
continue to be misled by the headline “employed” figure disseminated
by schools (that is, the high number of total employed graduates that
includes school-funded positions).  First, some who read law school
websites will not think to delve into the statistics to uncover the per-
centage of graduates who have found actual legal employment without
a school fellowship.  Second, prospective students consult secondary
sources that often reprint the headline figures without providing any
additional context.124  To avoid issuing misleading statistics, schools
should report a headline “total employed” figure that does not include
121. Based on the placement data UCLA submitted to the ABA, at least 62 of the 64
graduates in university-funded positions were among the graduates counted as
“Employed - Bar Passage Required.” See UCLA 2011 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY,
supra note 119.
122. See Class of 2011 Employment, B.U. SCH. L., http://www.bu.edu/law/prospective/
careers/jd/employmentstats2011.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2012).  An update re-
ports that BU’s employment numbers have improved substantially from the orig-
inal February 15 reporting cut-off date. See id.
123. See id. (showing total of 59 graduates in BU-funded positions); see also SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT SUM-
MARY FOR 2011 GRADUATES: BOSTON UNIVERSITY (2012), available at http://
employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (reporting 60 such graduates).  Of
the 197 law schools for which the ABA released 2011 data, only Notre Dame re-
ported a higher fraction of its graduates holding positions funded by the univer-
sity (22.6%). See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR
ASS’N, COMPLETE EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR 2011 GRADUATES (2012), available at
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (to reproduce these results,
one may compare—for each school—the number of total graduates and the num-
ber of graduates in school-funded jobs).
124. See, e.g., BCG ATT’Y SEARCH, THE 2012 BCG ATTORNEY SEARCH GUIDE TO
AMERICA’S TOP 50 LAW SCHOOLS 144, 147 (2012), available at http://www.bcg
search.com/pdf/BCG_Law_School_Guide_2012.pdf (reporting, based on U.S.
News data, that 96% of Georgetown’s 2010 graduates were “known to be em-
ployed nine months after graduation”); Yale University, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/
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graduates with school-funded jobs.  At minimum, such a figure should
be prominently displayed next to the headline figure of schools that
insist on leading with statistics that fail to account for the effects of
school-funded employment.
As far as honest marketing goes, I see no problem with the mere
existence of law school-funded jobs for law graduates.  The problem
arises when a perfectly reasonable—indeed, perhaps commendable—
program obscures the true employment prospects of law students.
Schools would perform a valuable service if they collected and shared
data about the jobs taken by graduates after their school-funded posi-
tions end.125
3. Salary Surveys of the Rich and Satisfied
In addition, schools commonly report salary statistics based on un-
representative samples, samples that skew high because of the ten-
dency of high-salaried graduates to respond to the surveys at higher
rates than low-salaried (and exclude unemployed graduates entirely
from the pool).126  This phenomenon continues today.  Therefore, pro-
spective students can be misled not just about the percentage of grad-
uates with real legal jobs, but also by salary statistics that
substantially overestimate the likely compensation of employed
graduates.
For example, Georgetown University Law Center presented salary
data on a webpage titled “Employment Statistics” with no disclaimer
concerning the tendency of higher-paid graduates to report sala-
ries.127  In the section for 2010 graduates in private practice, the 25th
percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile were all reported as
$160,000.  The “response rate” of 77.2% (down from 86.3% for private
lawyers in the class of 2009 surveyed nine months after their gradua-
tion, and 89.6% from the class of 2008) was the only clue that Ge-
orgetown graduates might not be earning quite as much as the across-
top-law-schools/law-school-03027 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (providing a figure
for “Graduates known to be employed at graduation” with no explanation).
125. For an example of a law school webpage presenting some data concerning the
subsequent outcomes of graduates taking school-funded positions, see Employ-
ment Data 9 Months After Graduation, WASH. & LEE SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/
admissions/ninemonthdata.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“For the Class of
2011, 64 students were enrolled in the program at graduation and 12 remained in
the program after nine months.”).
126. See supra note 60 (collecting evidence of upward skew); see also infra note 138
and accompanying text.
127. See Employment Statistics, GEO. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/career/
EmploymentStatistics.htm (last visited July 3, 2012).  Note that as of August 5,
2012, this page is no longer available online.  For sources linking to the original
page, see, for example, Twistedwrister, Comment to Detailed Employment Stats,
TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM (Feb. 18, 2012, 11:28 PM),  http://www.top-law-schools.
com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=174447&start=100.
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the-board “$160,000” implies.  Indeed, a separate page titled “Employ-
ment Data for 2011 Graduates” reveals that the response rate for pri-
vate sector salaries has dropped further to 60.8%.128  Georgetown
again reported a 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of
$160,000.129  Under NALP reporting guidelines, schools can enter sal-
aries for non-reporting graduates when such data are available to the
public.130  Entry-level salaries are known far more often for large
firms, which happen to have the highest salaries.131  It is therefore
fair to conclude that of the 39.2% of 2011 Georgetown graduates work-
ing in private practice whose compensation numbers were not part of
the law school’s salary survey data, few if any of them earned
$160,000.  If so, the 25th percentile for 2011 graduates’ private sector
salaries (that is, for all 2011 graduates working in private practice, as
opposed to those whose salaries Georgetown used to calculate its sta-
tistics) cannot have been close to $160,000, and the median may also
have been well below the advertised number.
At Wayne State University, the law school’s career services office
reports: “2010 Career Stats: 85.9% of our 2010 graduates seeking em-
ployment were successful in obtaining a job within nine months after
graduation with an average starting salary of $72,471.”132  The page
provides no disclaimer concerning the tendency of higher-paid gradu-
ates to report salaries.133  When one scrolls down the page, one learns
the “average” is the arithmetic mean; the median salary is $60,000.134
Further, of Wayne Law’s 145 graduates (122 of whom reported being
employed), only 51 reported a salary.135  A more accurate summary of
the data collected by Wayne Law would be: “Last year we graduated
145 students, and no more than 25 of them (17%) reported salaries
above $60,000.”
128. Employment Data for 2011 Graduates, GEO. L., supra note 111.
129. See id.
130. See authorities cited supra note 60.
131. See NALP, 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 60, at 2.
132. Wayne Law: Class of 2010 Career Statistics, WAYNE ST. U., http://law.wayne.edu/
career-services/2010stats.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
133. A prospective Wayne Law student might have questioned the salary numbers
more carefully upon reading a January 2011 National Jurist article by the
school’s dean. See Robert Ackerman, Is Law School Worth It? A Dean Looks Be-
hind the Numbers, NAT’L JURIST (Jan. 31, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.national
jurist.com/content/critical-issues/law-school-worth-it-dean-looks-behind-numbers
(“I suspect that those with higher salaries are more likely to report this data than
their lower salaried peers, so I do not put too much stock in our $100,000 median
salary figure for those employed in the private sector.”).  The Ackerman article
was also posted on the Wayne Law website.  Robert Ackerman, Is Law School
Worth It? A Dean Looks Behind the Numbers, DEAN BOB L. BLOG, (Jan. 31, 2011)
http://blogs.wayne.edu/lawdean/2011/01/31/is-law-school-worth-it-a-dean-looks-
behind-the-numbers/.
134. Wayne Law: Class of 2010 Career Statistics, WAYNE ST. U., supra note 132.
135. Id.
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On the “Out of State FAQ” webpage provided by the University of
Alabama School of Law, prospective students can read, “The starting
average salary for a 2009 Alabama Law graduate was $67,128.  That
figure would be even higher, but many graduates choose to work for
less salary as judicial clerks or in public interest positions (salary
figures are also impacted by geography).”136  No context is provided
for the statistic.137
Some law schools have begun releasing more forthright employ-
ment information.  For example, on the “Employment Data” page of
the University of Wisconsin Law School’s webpage, prospective stu-
dents are informed: “Because we receive starting salary data from
fewer than half of our most recent graduates, and because the data we
do receive tends to be disproportionately from graduates who join
larger law firms which pay the highest salaries, the Law School is not
in a position to provide complete and accurate salary information
about what our most recent graduates earn.”138  Loyola Law School
(Los Angeles) took a middle course, choosing to present the misleading
statistics along with a warning: “Salary figures were not reported by
all respondents.  Data reflects full-time, long-term positions only and
excludes comparatively high or low anomalous figures.  Salary figures
are not reported for self-employed.  For national salary statistics,
please consult the National Association for Law Placement,
Inc. . . .”139  Loyola’s choice is perhaps reasonable.140  A prospective
applicant might prefer incomplete (and upwardly skewed) salary data
to no data at all.  The presence of a warning similar to, or more robust
than, Loyola’s should be considered a minimum standard for a law
school that wishes to present alumni salary data without being ac-
cused of misrepresentation.141
136. Out of State FAQ, U. ALA. SCH. L., http://www.law.ua.edu/career-services/
prospective-students/out-of-state-faq/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
137. On the “Prospective Students” page, there is a link to the “Placement Summary”
forms submitted by Alabama to the ABA for the classes of 2011 and 2010. Pro-
spective Students, U. ALA. SCH. L., http://www.law.ua.edu/career-services/
prospective-students/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).  Those forms do not, however,
have any salary data.
138. Employment Data, U. WIS. L. SCH., http://law.wisc.edu/career/employmentdata/
index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
139. Employment Report for the Class of 2011, LOY. L. SCH. (February 15, 2012), http://
intranet.lls.edu/careerservices/stats/employmentstats.pdf.
140. The reasonableness will depend, in part, on the accuracy of the disclaimer.  A
reader cannot know, for example, how many “comparatively high” salaries Loyola
excluded from its calculations.
141. For an example of an inadequately robust disclaimer of misleading salary data,
see NYLS 2011 Stats, supra note 81 (stating, in small type, “Salary information
on this chart does not include compensation reported by those employed part
time.  For employment settings for which five or fewer graduates reported sala-
ries, salary information is intentionally left blank to protect the privacy of the
graduates.”).
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Although a new ABA regulation enacted during summer 2012 re-
quires some disclosures concerning salary data,142 it leaves substan-
tial room for interpretation and does not explicitly require that schools
explain why the data as currently collected is so unreliable.  In partic-
ular, one could argue about what it means to “clearly identify” the
“number of salaries and the percentage of graduates included in” sal-
ary data calculations.143  Because prospective students may not un-
derstand the significance of small sample sizes—especially if the
skewed nature of the sample is not explained—merely stating the raw
numbers will not suffice to avoid misrepresentation.
4. Scholarships with Terms Written in Fine Print
While unduly rosy employment statistics serve to increase the ap-
parent worth of a law degree, law schools further boost the apparent
value of legal education by offering merit-based scholarships to espe-
cially desirable applicants.  Unfortunately, as Professor Jerry Organ
has documented, many scholarship offers come with fine print not
comprehended by the offerees, causing entering students to misunder-
stand the terms of their merit awards.144  Organ notes:
[A]t the present moment, there is a profound information asymmetry between
law schools and prospective law students when it comes to scholarship offers.
At many Competitive Law Schools, the law schools are keenly aware of the
impact of a forced curve on first-year grades and know that they have offered
scholarships to significantly more first-year students than can possibly renew
their scholarships under the renewal conditions attached to the scholarships.
Prospective law students, by contrast, have generally performed very well ac-
ademically, frequently have not experienced how a forced grading curve func-
tions and well may perceive that by being granted a scholarship, they are
among the “best students” and should be able to remain among the “best stu-
dents” and retain a GPA or class rank that allows them to renew their scholar-
ship.  They are not aware that the law school has given out more scholarships
than possibly can be renewed and are not informed by the law school of the
likelihood of non-renewal.145
142. See ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013, supra note 101, Approval Stan-
dard No. 509 Interpretation 509-3 (“Any information, beyond that required by the
Council, regarding graduates’ salaries that a law school reports, publicizes or dis-
tributes must clearly identify the number of salaries and the percentage of gradu-
ates included in that information.”).
143. Id.  Must this information appear on the same page as the salary numbers?  In
the same type size?
144. See Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture
of Law School, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 190 (2011).  For more on law school schol-
arships (and recent criticism of certain practices), see Paul L. Caron, Merit Schol-
arships, Grading Curves & US News as Law School Bait and Switch, TAXPROF
BLOG (May 2, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/05/more-on-.
html (collecting links to several articles).
145. Organ, supra note 144, at 190.  A “competitive” law school is defined as one at
“which students receiving scholarship assistance as first-year students will re-
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For those unfamiliar with contingent merit scholarships—that is,
scholarships renewable for the second and third year of law school
only if the recipient performs well (beyond mere good academic stand-
ing) during the first year—Organ’s conclusions may require some un-
packing.  Let’s start from the bottom and work upward.  First, it is
often literally impossible for all scholarship recipients to retain their
awards after the first year.  Schools have been documented giving
more merit awards than can be renewed (e.g., granting scholarships to
over half of the entering class, while reserving renewal to those rank-
ing in the top third in first-year grades).146  Because law school is
often graded on a “forced curve,” scholarship renewal for all recipients
can be impossible even if schools set a GPA benchmark (e.g., 3.2 or
3.3) instead of using class rank.147  Second, prospective law students
do not know how many of their future classmates have been awarded
scholarships, meaning that even if they know, for example, that they
must finish in the top third of the class to retain their money, they do
not know that half the class has the same deal.  Third, because pro-
spective law students overestimate their own abilities (as does pretty
much everyone),148 they do not realistically assess their own likely
performance in law school.  Fourth, this optimism bias is exacerbated
by the different grading schemes used by law schools and by the un-
dergraduate programs from which most law students come.  For many
law students, it is not easy to imagine themselves ending up with a
GPA below 3.0—every good student they knew in college performed
tain their scholarships only if they perform to a certain level, e.g., in the top one-
quarter or top one-third of the first-year class.” Id. at 173.
146. See Steven Harper, Law School Deception, Part 3, AM. LAW. DAILY (May 22, 2011,
5:31 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/05/harper052011.
html (describing program at Golden Gate University School of Law).  According
to a study by Organ of 160 law schools, “it appears that 122—over 75% —have
some type of ‘competitive’ scholarship program while only thirty-one—fewer than
20%—have a ‘non-competitive’ scholarship program.”  Organ, supra note 144, at
183.  A “non-competitive” scholarship program is one “in which students receiv-
ing scholarship assistance as first-year students will retain their scholarships
provided they remain in good academic standing.” Id. at 173–74.
147. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Making the Grade: Some Principles of Comparative
Grading, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 599–600 (2002).  The details of law school grad-
ing curves are often confidential, meaning students cannot easily translate a
GPA benchmark into class rank.
148. See TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 142; James A. Shepperd et al., Exploring the
Causes of Comparative Optimism, 42 PSYCHOLOGICA BELGICA 65, 65 (2002)
(“Comparative optimism refers to the tendency for people to believe that they are
less likely to experience negative events and more likely to experience positive
events than are other people.”).
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far better149—yet half or even two-thirds of the first-year class falls
below this standard under merciless law school grading curves.150
Both Organ and Law School Transparency have called for more ro-
bust disclosure of scholarship details, proposing that law schools
should release sufficient data to allow prospective students to calcu-
late the expected value of their merit-aid offers.151  The ABA adopted
rules during the summer of 2012 that require schools to release some
additional scholarship data.152  It will take some time, however, to see
how law schools respond to the new rules.  One new requirement, that
149. See Catherine Rampell, A History of College Grade Inflation, N.Y. TIMES (July
14, 2011, 10:00 AM) http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/the-history-of-
college-grade-inflation/ (“Most recently, about 43 percent of all letter grades given
were A’s, an increase of 28 percentage points since 1960 and 12 percentage points
since 1988.”).
150. See, e.g., GOLDEN GATE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at
88–89 (2011) (noting that the maximum portion of students allowed to receive
grades of “B- and above” in first-year courses is 70%, and the minimum is 45%).
A grade of B- translates to a 2.67 for GPA calculations. Id. at 87; see also SOUTH
TEX. COLL. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 84 (2011) (“The class aver-
age shall be 2.85-3.15.”); Grades, GPAs, Class Standing, and Honors, U. WIS. L.
SCH., http://law.wisc.edu/current/rtf/09.0.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (“The
Law School’s guidelines for faculty to use in assigning grades provides that for all
first-year courses, and for advanced classes with an enrollment exceeding 30, the
mean grade (i.e., the class average) should fall between 2.85 and 3.1 on the 4.3
scale.”).  Not all schools have such tough curves. See, e.g., Grading Policy, U. TEX.
SCH. L., http://www.utexas.edu/law/sao/academics/gradingpolicy.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2013) (“The expected mean grade in all courses other than seminars
shall be 3.30.”).  Note that the inclusion of a law school’s grading policy in this
footnote is not meant to imply that the school awards contingent merit scholar-
ships.  Texas, for example, requires only that a student remain in good academic
standing. Cf. Scholarships, UNIV. TEX. SCH. L., https://www.utexas.edu/law/
finaid/scholarships/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) (showing 99% retention rate).
151. See Organ, supra note 144, at 190, 194 (“[T]here is a profound need for greater
clarity and transparency with respect to scholarship awards and renewal rates.”);
Proposing a New Standard to Require Scholarship Retention Information, L.
SCH. TRANSPARENCY (Apr. 30, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.
com/2011/04/proposing-a-new-standard-to-require-scholarship-retention-informa
tion/.
152. See Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging: Revised Standard Bars Law Schools
from Publishing Misleading Consumer Info, ABA J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:46 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_bars_law_
schools_from_publishing_misleadin/; Karen Sloan, ABA Backs off Making Law
Schools Report Graduates’ Salaries, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.law.
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202546229913&ABA_backs_off_making_law_
schools_report_graduates_salaries_ (“The ABA’s Council of the Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar on March 17 gave preliminary approval to a
new accreditation standard that would require law schools to report additional
details about their scholarship retention rates . . . .”).  The revision adds “condi-
tional scholarships” to the list of subjects about which law schools must publish
consumer information, and it mandates the posting of consumer information on-
line. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 103 (2012), available at http://
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a law school “shall publicly disclose on its website consumer informa-
tion [about] . . . conditional scholarships,”153 leaves substantial room
for interpretation.  Perhaps more promising is the new rule providing:
“A law school shall publicly disclose on its website, in the form desig-
nated by the Council, its conditional scholarship retention data.  A law
school shall also distribute this data to all applicants being offered
conditional scholarships at the time the scholarship offer is ex-
tended.”154  Depending on what specific disclosures the Council re-
quires—and the form in which it is displayed to offerees—this
information could be helpful.
Regardless of what is required by the ABA, NALP, U.S. News, or
other entities collecting data from law schools, law schools should im-
mediately begin disclosing material information to scholarship offer-
ees.  Such information includes the percentage (disaggregated for the
first-year, second-year, and third-year classes) of students receiving
merit aid, the raw number of such students in each class, the mean
and median of the awards for each class, and the percent of students
(in the second- and third-year classes) receiving merit aid during the
previous year whose scholarships were renewed.155  This information
should be prominently displayed on law school websites, and it should
be included with all scholarship offers.  In addition, when making new
offers, schools should disclose the approximate percentage of students
in the entering class likely to hold similar scholarships.  While exact
data will not be available at the time admissions and scholarship of-
fers are made, a useful disclosure might read something like, “In the
most recent first-year class, [40] percent of the class held a merit
scholarship contingent on maintaining a GPA of [3.2], and we expect
[a similar number] of next year’s entering students will have similar
awards.  In recent years, about [20] percent of the first-year class has
maintained a GPA at or above [3.2], causing [half] of the scholarship
recipients to forfeit their awards.”156  Without such a disclosure, a
statement like “we hereby offer you a merit scholarship of $10,000 per
year, renewable upon the maintenance of a 3.2 GPA” is materially
misleading.
www.abanow.org/2012/06/2012am103/ (follow “Proposed Resolution and Report”
link) (providing blackline showing changes to ABA Standard 509).
153. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013, supra note 101, Approval Standard
No. 509(b)(2).
154. Id. Approval Standard No. 509(e).  The “Council” mentioned is the Council of the
ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.
155. See Organ, supra note 144, at 194.
156. The information in brackets would of course vary from one school to another.
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5. Underreported Law School Debt and Other Matters
In addition to the marketing strategies discussed above, a few
other matters deserve some attention here even though space con-
straints preclude a thorough exploration.  First, law schools have long
understated the amount of educational debt incurred by their stu-
dents, with some schools recently admitting they have underreported
their graduates’ indebtedness by as much as two-thirds.  Second, loan
repayment assistance programs—often described as a way for stu-
dents to pursue public interest law without servicing large debts157—
contain complex eligibility rules that preclude many graduates from
participating.  Third, the focus on employment statistics concerning
recent graduates—NALP and ABA data collection from law schools
concerns current students and recent graduates almost exclusively—
prevents prospective students from evaluating the longer-term eco-
nomic value of legal education.
Underreported Debt.  Each year, law schools report to the ABA on
their students’ educational loans.  News media then review the data
and report on matters like the “average education debt for law grads”
and the schools with the highest and lowest per capita debt loads.158
Prospective students might reasonably believe the numbers reported
in such stories represent the “average education debt” (or at least the
average amount borrowed for law school) of law graduates.  Because it
can be difficult to estimate the cost of housing, books, and other costs,
the amount borrowed by recent graduates could be helpful in predict-
ing the real cost of legal education.  Unfortunately, the numbers re-
ported systematically understate the actual indebtedness of
graduates.  The ABA requests schools to report “[t]he average amount
borrowed in law school by . . . J.D. graduates who borrowed at least
one education loan in law school.”159  In the instructions for that ques-
tion, the ABA states that schools should “only include information
for . . . law school debt (e.g. not including undergraduate debt)” and
that schools should report the “[t]otal loans for law school processed
through the university or law school financial aid office,” a number
that should “not include post J.D. loans (i.e. bar loans) even if distrib-
uted prior to graduation.”160  If schools follow these instructions, the
157. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
158. E.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Debt of Private Law School Grads Is $125K;
It’s Highest at These Five Schools, ABA J. (Mar. 28, 2012, 5:29 AM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/average_debt_load_of_private_law_grads_is_125k_
these_five_schools_lead_to_m/.
159. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE pt. 4, at 6 (2010), available at http://
lawschooltransparency.com/documents/Annual_ABA_Questionnaires/2010/2010
%20AQ%20Part%204%20-%20Financial%20Aid.pdf.
160. Id. at 1.  For a more recent (and substantially similar) version of the instructions,
see AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS pt. IV, at 5
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
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numbers reported as “average education debt” in U.S. News and other
sources161 will not account for debt accrued during law school, will not
account for the common practice of bar loans, and will ignore any
loans not processed by university financial aid offices.162  All this com-
bines to substantially understate the debt burden facing law school
graduates, simply because the ABA questionnaire asks the wrong
question.  In addition, some schools failed to follow the forms’ instruc-
tions and vastly understated their numbers even further, erasing two-
thirds of their students’ debts.163
Confusing Loan Repayment Assistance Programs.  To encourage
attendance by students interested in practicing public interest law,
several law schools operate loan repayment assistance programs
(LRAP), which provide some financial assistance to certain gradu-
ates.164  The programs are advertised in law school marketing materi-
als as a way to make public service affordable.165  Space limitations in
brochures prevent the presentation of details such as eligibility rules
(what debt is covered, how much debt is covered, what jobs qualify),
income caps (amount you may earn and still qualify, whether your
spouse’s well-paid job counts toward the cap), and the effect of unem-
ployment on eligibility (is there an application deadline soon after
graduation, is someone unable to find a public interest job by then
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governancedocuments/2012_part_4
_financial_aid.authcheckdam.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Ben Trachtenberg, Op-Ed., Rethinking Pro Bono, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2012, at A23 (repeating lowball debt figures based on submissions to ABA).  I
teach law for a living and write about legal education, yet it did not occur to me
when writing the op-ed just cited that the debt figures were understated across
the board.  I think it is fair to assume that prospective law students are also
misled by the figures currently collected and reported.
162. The numbers reported would also appear to ignore loan origination fees.
163. See infra at notes 280–83 and accompanying text.
164. See generally Philip G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repay-
ment Assistance Programs with New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583,
587–89 (2011) (describing development of LRAPs); COMM’N ON LOAN REPAYMENT
& FORGIVENESS, AM. BAR ASS’N, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A
BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE (2003) (analyzing the impact of the educational debt
problem on the legal profession and society, and recommending a comprehensive
package of programs, including LRAPs, to provide relief for and incentives to law-
yers who want to pursue public service careers).
165. See, e.g., CORNELL LAW SCH., J.D. VIEWBOOK 2013, at 32 (2012), available at http:/
/www.lawschool.cornell.edu/admissions/apply/JD-Viewbook-2013.cfm (“Through
one of the nation’s most generous loan repayment programs, the Public Interest
Low Income Protection Plan (PILIPP) provides sizable grants to help with the
payment of student loans.”); VANDERBILT UNIV. LAW SCH., VIEWBOOK 2013, at 14
(2012), available at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/prospective-students/admissions/
request-a-viewbook/download.aspx?id=8388 (statement of a recent graduate) (“I
wanted to be able to do policy work supporting the education and welfare of chil-
dren, and Vanderbilt’s Loan Repayment Assistance Program makes it possible
for me to do this work.”).
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forever disqualified).  In addition, the relationship between LRAPs
and the federal income-based repayment (IBR) program is often
murky.166  Such information, sometimes but not always available on a
law school website,167 should be posted in prominent locations online,
and marketing materials promoting LRAP should direct prospective
students to the fine print, which varies importantly from one school to
another.168
Sparse Data on Long-term Employment Prospects.  NALP and ABA
employment data, as well as that collected by U.S. News, concern law
students and very recent graduates, largely ignoring the situations of
graduates more than one year out of law school.  Without such data,
one cannot estimate the long-term economic value of a law degree,
even if one somehow corrected all of the existing flaws with current
employment statistics.  For example, even if we somehow could learn
the real median salary data for law school graduates—instead of see-
ing inflated numbers like those collected today169—that information
would shed no light on how salaries change over time.  Do students get
better, higher-paying jobs, or do they wash out of the best paying jobs
after a few years and settle for less remunerative work?  A law school
(or anyone else, for that matter) that collected accurate employment
data for, say, the class of 2003 or 2008 would provide a valuable
service.170
166. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 119–25 (explaining effects of IBR on hypo-
thetical law graduates); Dan, Untangling the Tangled Web of LRAP and IBR,
NUTS & BOALTS (Oct. 8, 2010, 10:55 AM), http://boaltalk.blogspot.com/2010/10/
untangling-tangled-web-of-lrap-and-ibr.html. But see Philip G. Schrag, Failing
Law Schools — Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
(forthcoming 2013) (reviewing Tamanaha and arguing that the new Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) plan provides better options than were previously available under
IBR).  Among other unsettled issues is the potential tax liability of graduates
participating in IBR/PAYE. See Ron Lieber, For Student Borrowers, Relief Now
May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, at B1 (“For many
people, especially those who finished graduate or professional school with six
figures of debt, the tax bill could be well into the five figures.  And when it comes,
you are supposed to pay in full, immediately.”).
167. See, e.g., Loan Assistance Repayment Program FAQs, N.Y.U. SCH. L., http://www.
law.nyu.edu/financialaid/lrap/lrapfaq/index.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
168. See Schrag & Pruett, supra note 164, at 588–89 (describing differences among
programs).  Someone who collected and reviewed all the fine print and then made
the details available in a format accessible to prospective applicants, especially
one allowing comparisons among law schools, would provide a valuable service.
169. See supra subsection II.C.3.
170. For an example of the limited research in this area, see Jeffrey Evans Stake et
al., Income and Career Satisfaction in the Legal Profession: Survey Data from
Indiana Law School Graduates, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 939 (2007).
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III. LEGAL ETHICS RULES PROHIBIT DISHONEST LAW
SCHOOL MARKETING
In addition to violating moral norms against lying, dishonest law
school marketing, when committed by lawyers, violates rules of pro-
fessional conduct enacted to regulate the legal profession.  This Part
reviews professional conduct rules that law school officials have vio-
lated with misleading statements about legal education.  Specifically,
Rule 8.4(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits law-
yers from engaging in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresenta-
tion.”171  Courts and disciplinary bodies have interpreted state rules
modeled on this provision to cover dishonest conduct beyond the prac-
tice of law.  Further, Rule 8.3(a) requires that lawyers report certain
misconduct of other lawyers.172  Although the precise application of
the Model Rules—or, to be more precise, the rules of professional con-
duct of the several states—to dishonest law school marketing is debat-
able, two things are clear:  First, at least some dishonest law school
marketing has violated at least some ethical rules.  Second, little if
any disciplinary action has resulted from these violations.
A. Rule 8.4(c): No Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or
Misrepresentation
Model Rule 8.4 lists various kinds of lawyer misconduct.  Rule
8.4(c) provides, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation.”173  When interpreting provisions based on this model
rule,174 state courts and disciplinary bodies have made clear that law-
yers are subject to discipline for dishonest conduct even when that
conduct does not directly involve the practice of law, so long as the
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012), available at http://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html.  Al-
though the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not have the force of
law, they serve as the basis of the majority of state legal ethics codes. See LISA G.
LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 27, 40
(2d ed. 2008).  When this Article refers to a provision as “Rule” or “Model Rule”
without citing a specific state code, the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct are the intended referent.  For an edition of the Model Rules that includes
state variations from each Rule, see STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2012).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012).  Brief attention is also given
below to Rule 7.1, which prohibits false and misleading communications about
lawyers and their services, and to Rule 5.1, which requires that supervisory law-
yers make reasonable efforts to ensure ethical conduct by their subordinates.
173. Id. at R. 8.4(c).
174. For state provisions with text identical or materially identical to the Model Rule,
see ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012); ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009); OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3) (2012).
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conduct calls into question whether the lawyer possesses the honest
character necessary for the practice of law.175  Accordingly, a lawyer-
parent who knowingly lies to a child about the presence of ice cream in
the freezer has not violated Rule 8.4(c).176  But a lawyer-landlord who
files a false police report to harass a tenant would be subject to
discipline.177
The story of Oregon lawyer Jim Carpenter illustrates the sort of
dishonest conduct unrelated to legal practice that can result in profes-
sional discipline of a lawyer.  Engaging in what he later described as a
“practical joke,” Carpenter created a Classmates.com profile in the
name of a high school contemporary.178  The impersonated acquain-
tance was a high school teacher, and Carpenter wrote in the fake pro-
file, “Hey all!  How is it going.  I am married to an incredibly beautiful
woman, AND I get to hang out with high school chicks all day (and
some evenings too).  I have even been lucky with a few.  It just doesn’t
get better than this.”179  After a third party alerted the impersonated
teacher’s employer about the posting, which the teacher denied having
written, a police investigation eventually revealed Carpenter’s de-
ceit.180  Carpenter admitted his wrongdoing but argued that it did not
violate the professional conduct rules governing Oregon lawyers.181
175. See, e.g., In re Serritella, 125 N.E.2d 531, 534 (Ill. 1955) (“[W]e are interested in
their private conduct only in so far as such relates to their professional compe-
tence or affects the dignity of the legal profession.”); see ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 (2004) (“Obligation of a Lawyer to Re-
port Professional Misconduct by a Lawyer Not Engaged in the Practice of Law”);
see also Josh Gerstein, Clinton Eligible, Once Again, to Practice Law, N.Y.
SUN (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.nysun.com/national/clinton-eligible-once-again-
to-practice-law/25965/ (mentioning “the law license [President Bill Clinton] gave
up as a consequence of the inaccurate responses he gave under oath to questions
about his relationship with a White House intern”).
176. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 65.5, at 65-15 (3d ed. 2012) (“[C]ourts and disciplinary authorities applying
Rule 8.4(c) . . . commonly have given it a sensible reading that forgives truly
trivial deceptions and misrepresentations . . . .”).
177. See In re Schaeffer, 45 A.3d 149 (Del. 2012) (imposing public reprimand on law-
yer who falsely reported a “hostage situation” during 911 call); In re Grossman,
211 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. 1973) (false police report); In re Asbell, 640 A.2d 837 (N.J.
1994) (false police report); see also In re Siegel, 627 A.2d 156 (N.J. 1993) (holding
that lawyer who steals from partners violates Rule 8.4(c) even if no client is
defrauded).
178. In re Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203, 206 (Or. 2004).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 206–07.
181. The Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility provision at issue was Discipli-
nary Rule 1-102(a)(3), which provided, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion.”  As of January 1, 2005, the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (which are
based on the ABA Model Rules) replaced the Oregon Code (which had been based
on the older ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility) in its entirety.  For
the current provision, see OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3) (2012).
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The initial trial panel dismissed the complaint against Carpenter,
finding that the rule prohibiting dishonesty does not “does not extend
to the kind of non-professional, unregulated conduct found in this
case.”182
A divided Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed and imposed a pub-
lic reprimand.183  The court began by noting that the prohibition on
lawyer dishonesty “contains no requirement that, to violate that rule,
the lawyer’s conduct must be subject to criminal or administrative
sanctions” and that while the rule “does refer to ‘professional miscon-
duct,’ this court has held that the rule does not require that the lawyer
be acting in his or her capacity as a lawyer.”184  The court then ex-
plained how it distinguished punishable dishonesty from those lies
unrelated to law practice that sit beyond the scope of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct:
[T]his court examines lawyer conduct that occurs outside the scope of profes-
sional relationships, such as that of attorney and client, to determine whether
the conduct jeopardizes the public’s interest in the integrity and trustworthi-
ness of lawyers.  Not every lawyer misstatement poses that risk: telling the
story of Santa Claus to children is an example.  Instead, there must be a ra-
tional connection between the conduct that gives rise to an allegation of a rule
violation and the purpose of the lawyer discipline system.  That is, the accused
lawyer’s conduct must demonstrate that the lawyer lacks those characteristics
that are essential to the practice of law.185
In this case, the court found that Carpenter exhibited “dishonesty”
when he impersonated the teacher, that the dishonesty wasted the
time of public officials and subjected the teacher to hassle and embar-
rassment, and that the conduct “reflects adversely on the accused’s
fitness to practice law, because it causes us to question whether the
accused possesses the requisite trustworthiness and integrity to han-
dle important matters involving legal rights that clients commonly en-
trust to lawyers.”186
182. Carpenter, 95 P.3d at 207.
183. Compare id. at 214 (“The accused is publicly reprimanded.”), with id. (Balmer, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that prohibited misconduct can “include conduct by a law-
yer involving ‘dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,’ even if that con-
duct does not violate the criminal law or occur in the course of the practice of law”
but rejecting “the majority’s conclusion that the accused’s conduct in this in-
stance violated” the rule).
184. Id. at 207 (citing In re Coe, 731 P.2d 1028 (Or. 1987)); see also In re Germundson,
724 P.2d 793 (Or. 1986) (holding that a lawyer violated the prohibition on dishon-
esty by enrolling as a student in a class he was teaching in order to avoid a reduc-
tion in government benefits when the lawyer knew he could not receive credit as
a student); In re Houchin, 622 P.2d 723 (Or. 1981) (holding that a lawyer violated
this rule by executing a promissory note as a representative of a corporation
when the lawyer knew he had no authority to act as such a representative).
185. Carpenter, 95 P.3d at 208.
186. Id. at 210.  The court noted that the existence of rumors in the community con-
cerning a sexual relationship between the teacher and a high school student did
not remove the taint of dishonesty from Carpenter’s impersonation of the
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Other, less salacious cases illustrate that lawyers can face disci-
pline for lying, even if no clients or courts are involved.  The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals imposed a thirty-day suspension on a law-
yer who “falsified his resume and altered his law school transcripts in
an attempt to obtain legal employment in California.”187  The Su-
preme Court of Washington suspended a lawyer for ninety days for
similar—but more extensive—conduct.188  The Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana imposed a six-month suspension, with all but sixty days de-
ferred, upon a lawyer who made false statements about his domicile in
the context of running for public office.189  The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois censured a lawyer (with dissenting justices calling for more pun-
ishment) who plagiarized portions of academic work submitted toward
an LL.M. degree.190
In light of the common application of Rule 8.4(c) to lawyers who
engage in dishonesty unconnected with the practice of law, there is
little doubt that dishonest law school marketing conducted by mem-
bers of the bar justifies professional discipline.  Paul Pless lied repeat-
edly, over a period of years, about the quality of incoming students at
the University of Illinois College of Law, deceiving the ABA and U.S.
News, along with prospective students and others who relied on statis-
tics they compiled.191  Mark Sargent conspired with colleagues to en-
gage in similar conduct at Villanova.192  Can anyone dispute that
these men engaged in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”?  Surely serial dishonesty—committed with the
purpose of gaming the rankings used by prospective students deciding
whether and where to spend tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of
dollars—is at least as serious a violation as falsifying a resume and
transcript.193  Pless is admitted to practice in Washington and com-
mitted his wrongdoing while employed in Illinois.  Precedent in both
teacher’s identity.  Indeed, the teacher’s fragile reputation increased the damage
caused by the fake profile. Id. at 209–10.
187. In re Hawn, 917 A.2d 693 (D.C. 2007).
188. See In re Lavery, 587 P.2d 157 (Wash. 1978).  “He falsified his law school tran-
script to show a grade point average of 3.79 and wrote bogus and extremely
favorable letters of recommendation over the photocopied signatures of several of
his law school professors.  These falsified documents were sent to prospective em-
ployers, both public and private, with letters of application for a job.” Id. at 157.
189. See In re Richmond, 996 So. 2d 282 (La. 2008).
190. In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 552–53 (1982); id. at 553 (Underwood, J., dis-
senting) (“Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent’s con-
duct warrants discipline, the censure imposed seems to me an inadequate
response to the deliberate and deceitful nature of respondent’s conduct.”).
191. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
193. The ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide, “Absent aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances, . . . Disbarment is generally appropriate
when . . . a lawyer engages in . . . intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fit-
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states compels a finding that Pless deserves professional discipline.194
The same is true for Sargent, who is admitted in Massachusetts and
lied in Pennsylvania.195  As discussed below, lawyers with personal
knowledge of the deceit practiced by Pless and Sargent likely have a
professional duty to report their misconduct, and others—lawyers and
nonlawyers alike—may refer the matter to disciplinary authorities
upon a good faith belief that misconduct occurred.196
The same is also likely true for some of the other dishonesty cata-
logued above.  Sargent and Pless present easy cases because their de-
ceit was so brazen; closer questions are presented when law school
officials approve advertisements and spread statistics that are merely
misleading, rather than completely false.  There has been some debate
recently about whether Rule 8.4(c) covers such statements.197  The
ness to practice.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard
No. 5.11(b) (1992).
194. See Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d at 553 (censure for lawyer who submitted plagiarized
thesis in course of obtaining master’s degree in law); In re Lavery, 587 P.2d 157
(Wash. 1978) (ninety-day suspension for lawyer who falsified law school tran-
script and forged letters of recommendation).
195. See In re Barrett, 852 N.E.2d 660, 667 (Mass. 2006) (misappropriation of corpo-
rate funds unrelated to law practice justifies discipline as “conduct that is dishon-
est or deceitful, or that adversely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice”); In
re Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa. 1971) (stating that prohibition on “ ‘conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation’ . . . is not limited to con-
duct in the practice of law, but reaches to general activities”).  Also, Sargent knew
his lies would spread beyond Pennsylvania; he intentionally disseminated false-
hoods nationwide.  Sargent’s behavior is especially outrageous when one consid-
ers his position as leader of a religious law school, who described his duties as a
“servant leader” as including helping his school serve as an antidote to “the de-
tachment of professionalization from a commitment to justice, the triumph of
business values, and the alienation of so many lawyers from their vocations.”
Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the Dean in
an Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 171, 173 (2001).
196. See infra sections III.B and III.C.
197. See People v. Perez, 946 N.Y.S.2d 835, 844–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (discussing
memoranda prepared by professors of legal ethics and by retired judge of New
York Court of Appeals); Memorandum of Prof. Marc O. DeGirolami at 6, People v.
Perez, 946 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)  (Indictment No. 1202/09) (opining
that Rule 8.4 does not cover “misleading” conduct but instead, “by the terms of
the rule itself, it targets dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful conduct, as well as
conduct in which a lawyer openly misrepresents material facts or law”); Prof.
Yaroshefsky’s April 14, 2010 Report (as Corrected April 27, 2010) with Cover Let-
ters at 4, People v. Perez, 946 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)  (Indictment
No. 1202/09) (“Rule 8.4(c) prohibits misleading conduct as well as affirmatively
deceptive conduct irrespective of intent or knowledge of the lawyer.”).  This case
has attracted substantial attention in New York because it involves a finding by a
state trial judge that the office of the Queens District Attorney has behaved un-
ethically. See Daniel Wise, D.A. Seeks to Bar Enforcement of Ruling Finding
Office Unethical, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202550601057&DA_Seeks_to_Bar_Enforcement_of_
Ruling_Finding_Office_Unethical&slreturn=20120830144035.
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District of Columbia Court of Appeals, considering a precursor to Rule
8.4(c), noted that the “most general term in DR 1-102(A)(4) is ‘dishon-
esty,’ which encompasses fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative
behavior.”198  It continued, “In addition to these, however, it encom-
passes conduct evincing ‘a lack of honesty, probity or integrity in prin-
ciple; [a] lack of fairness and straightforwardness . . . .’  Thus, what
may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation may still evince dishonesty.”199  The court then concluded:
Given the “technically true” nature of respondent’s answers to questions posed
by revenue agents, and his abstinence from actual false statements or affirm-
ative acts of concealment, we decline to describe his financial arrangements
and his parsimonious dissemination of information as either fraudulent, de-
ceitful, or misrepresentative, which all describe degrees or kinds of active de-
ception or positive falsehood. . . .  We deem this issue a close one, however, and
thus experience no difficulty in characterizing these arrangements as evincing
a lack of integrity and straightforwardness, and therefore dishonest.200
Mere negligence, however, should not lead to findings of “dishon-
esty,” much less “fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”201  For example,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a lawyer whose billing prac-
tices were “sloppy” but did not involve “an intent to deceive” did not
violate Rule 8.4(c).202  Similarly, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of
the Supreme Court of Colorado found no violation resulting from a
voicemail that “might have been poorly articulated, extemporaneous
and made in haste, but [fell] short of clear and convincing evidence of
198. In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 767 (D.C. 1990).  The District now uses rules based
on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Under the former disciplinary
rules at issue in Shorter, DR 1-102(A)(4) provided that a “lawyer shall
not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion.” D.C. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (Repealed 1990).
Model Rule 8.4(c) is materially identical. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4(c) (2012).
199. Shorter, 570 A.2d at 767–68 (quoting Tucker v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (Kan.
1967)).
200. Id. at 768; see also In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1242 (D.C. 1998) (“We
take as a given that, for disciplinary purposes, dishonesty does not always de-
pend on a finding of intent to defraud or deceive.”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Sheridan, 741 A.2d 1143, 1156–57 (Md. 1999) (quoting Shorter with approval).
But see In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 923 (D.C. 1987) (“In the absence of af-
firmative proof of a fraudulent intent or state of mind, we hold that Hutchinson’s
misdemeanor conviction did not establish a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).”).
201. E.g., In re Varriano, 755 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. 2008) (“The referee thus ap-
pears to have made a credibility determination that, despite what he should have
known or suspected, Varriano did not in fact know or suspect the endorsement on
the check was forged.  We conclude that the referee’s finding that Varriano did
not act dishonestly, and his conclusion that Varriano’s action in cashing the
check did not violate Rule 8.4(c), are not clearly erroneous.”). But see In re Quinn,
184 P.3d 235, 313–14 (Kan. 2008) (holding that Rule 8.4(c) has no “requirement of
wrongful intent in misrepresentation cases” as opposed to cases in which dishon-
esty, fraud, or deceit is charged).
202. In re Lawrence, 954 So. 2d 113, 117 (La. 2007).
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an intent to deceive.”203  Recklessness—a mental state more culpable
than negligence but less culpable than intent—may be sufficient to
support a Rule 8.4(c) violation, depending on the state.204  Several
states have no authority setting forth what mental state applies.205
In cases of technically accurate yet misleading law school market-
ing, the question is whether the lawyers involved exhibited either an
intent to mislead or, in certain states, recklessness such that disci-
pline is appropriate.206  As knowledge of the highly misleading nature
203. People v. Chambers, 154 P.3d 419, 426 (Colo. 2006).
204. Compare In re Dodge, 108 P.3d 362, 366 (Idaho 2005) (“[C]lear and convincing
evidence both of misrepresentation and the intent or purpose to deceive is needed
to demonstrate a violation of the rule.”), and State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Besly, 136 P.3d 590, 605 (Okla. 2006) (“Rule 8.4(c) has an intent requirement and
to prove a violation the OBA must adequately show the attorney had a purpose to
deceive.”), with In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106, 1113–14 (D.C. 2007) (“[E]ven if Re-
spondent’s conduct was in reckless disregard of the truth rather than specifically
intended to deceive . . . he would have violated Rule 8.4(c).”), In re
Cleaver–Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 404 (D.C. 2006) (“[A]n attorney who recklessly
maintains inadequate time records, and consciously disregards the risk that she
may overcharge a client . . . engages in dishonesty within the meaning of Rule
8.4(c).”), and In re Fisher, 202 P.3d 1186, 1203 (Colo. 2009) (“[A] mental state of
at least recklessness is required for an 8.4(c) violation.”). See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (stating that reckless
falsehoods should be covered by precursor to Rule 8.4(c)).
205. See infra notes 254–60 and accompanying text (discussing what standard is ap-
propriate). Compare In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2003) (discuss-
ing Pennsylvania’s adoption of recklessness standard), with id. at 239 (Cowen, J.,
dissenting) (noting many states have not decided whether reckless statements
are covered).
206. Although mere negligence is not sufficient for discipline under Rule 8.4(c), it is
instructive to recall that misleading lawyer advertising is punishable under Rule
7.1 regardless of the intent behind a misleading communication.  See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2012); see also GILLERS ET AL., supra note 171,
at 420–25 (collecting state variations).  In lawyer advertising, “[t]ruthful state-
ments that are misleading are prohibited.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
7.1 cmt. 2 (2012).  And Rule 7.1 treats as false or misleading any communication
that “omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
materially misleading.” Id. at R. 7.1.  If a reasonable person might be misled by a
piece of lawyer advertising, the communication is likely prohibited. See, e.g., In
re Anonymous, 775 N.E.2d 1094 (Ind. 2002) (ordering a private reprimand where
a lawyer placed ad in newspaper stating “Bankruptcy, but keep house & car” but
failed to state that obligations to secured lenders must be reaffirmed in bank-
ruptcy for debtor to keep house and car).  To be fair, most misleading lawyer ad-
vertising goes unpunished, and the legal profession does a far from perfect job in
policing lawyer misconduct. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When No-
body’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Under-
enforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 974 (2011) (“[A]dvertising
regulation is simply one of many underenforced aspects of legal ethics codes.”).
Nonetheless, true-but-misleading lawyer advertising is prohibited and some-
times results in professional discipline.  The contrast with law school marketing
could hardly be more stark.  Whereas a lawyer using the phrase “specializing in
matrimonial law” in an advertisement can be subject to discipline for implying
2013] LAW SCHOOL MARKETING AND LEGAL ETHICS 907
of commonly used statistics becomes more widely known in the legal
academy, findings of intent and recklessness should become increas-
ingly easy to reach.
B. Rule 8.3(a):  Duty to Report Significant Misconduct of
Other Lawyers
Model Rule 8.3, titled “Reporting Professional Misconduct,” states
that a “lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional au-
thority.”207  Analogous rules have been adopted by most states with
some variations.208  The mandatory reporting requirement has taken
some criticism,209 and few cases report the discipline of lawyers under
Rule 8.3(a) absent some misconduct beyond the failure to report an-
other lawyer’s violation.210  Nonetheless, reporting the serious mis-
conduct of other lawyers is a genuine professional duty, and lawyers
have indeed been punished for failing to obey.211
As the language of the rule makes clear, not all rule violations cre-
ate a reporting duty for other lawyers.  Before one lawyer can be re-
quired to report the misconduct of another, the first lawyer must
“know” of the violation.  No definition of knowledge is provided in Rule
8.3 or its comments.212  Most courts construing the rule have held that
certification as a specialist, e.g., In re Peperone, 615 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. 1994),
law schools commonly advertise the percentage of their graduates who are em-
ployed nine months after graduation without a prominent disclaimer concerning
graduates employed by the university, graduates working part-time or temporary
jobs, or graduates working outside the legal profession.
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012).
208. See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 171, at 489–93 (collecting state variations); see,
e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010) (imposing narrower reporting
requirement); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:8.3(a) (2005) (requiring re-
porting of violations without “substantial question” qualifier); W. VA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1989) (adopting Model Rule). But see GA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2001) (making reporting permissive rather than
mandatory); GILLERS ET AL., supra note 171, at 490 (“The California Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct have no comparable provision.”).
209. See, e.g., Arthur Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Miscon-
duct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2003).
210. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 176, § 64.
211. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. 1988) (imposing one-year suspension);
In re Condit, No. SB-94-0021-D (Ariz. Mar. 14, 1995) (en banc); see also Skolnick
v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13 (Ill. 2000) (stating that “the duty to report
misconduct is absolute” and mentioning “the certain discipline that flows from a
breach of that duty”); Ronald Rotunda, The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another Law-
yer’s Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977,
985–91 (1988) (discussing when whistleblowing is required).
212. There is a definition of “knowingly,” “known,” and “knows” in the “Terminology”
section of the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2012).
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reporting is required only when a lawyer has a “substantial basis” for
believing that a violation occurred, which has been interpreted as re-
quiring more than mere probable cause; knowledge of a violation is
analogized to a “clear belief . . . based on pertinent facts.”213  Assum-
ing a lawyer “knows” of another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, the next inquiry is whether the misconduct “raises
a substantial question as to [the offending] lawyer’s honesty, trustwor-
thiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”214  Not every rule
violation raises such a substantial question; Rule 8.3(a) was intention-
ally drafted to cover only especially serious misconduct, unlike the
prior Model Code provision.215  A comment to the rule explains, “This
Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regu-
lating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent.”216  While this
standard is somewhat vague,217 some patterns have emerged from va-
rious states’ interpretation of the rule.  First, criminal acts deemed
misconduct by Rule 8.4(b) normally must be reported.218  Second, vio-
lations of Rule 8.4(c)—the rule prohibiting “dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation”219—can trigger the reporting requirement.220
If any conduct by a lawyer “raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty,” surely a years-long pattern of intentional deceit,
like those committed by Paul Pless and Mark Sargent, qualifies.221
Yet courts have stated that there is no definition when discussing Rule 8.3. See,
e.g., Attorney U v. Miss. Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 970 (Miss. 1996) (“Proper determi-
nation of this issue is hampered by Rule 8.3(a)’s failure to define ‘knowledge.’
The Official Comment adds nothing at all.”).
213. Attorney U, 678 So. 2d at 970–71 (quoting D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics
Op. 246 (1994)); see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional
Misconduct: A Practical Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 175, 185–86 (1999) (collecting cases and bar counsel opinions on the
knowledge requirement).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012).
215. See Richmond, supra note 213, at 177–79; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2012) (“If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the
Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense.
Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be
unenforceable.”).
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2012).
217. See Greenbaum, supra note 209, at 285 & n.44.
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2012) (“It is professional miscon-
duct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”); Rich-
mond, supra note 213, at 190–91.
219. See supra notes 173–96 and accompanying text.
220. See Richmond, supra note 213, at 191–93.
221. See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.  The lengthy period of misconduct
also evokes a comparison to Model Rule 5.1, which concerns “Responsibilities of
Supervisors for Maintenance of Ethical Compliance” at law firms and other orga-
nizations practicing law.  The rule provides:
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm,
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Who will vouch for the “trustworthiness” of these former law school
administrators?  As for their “fitness as a lawyer,” who would hire
them?  The question then becomes whether any lawyer “knows” of
their misconduct and has a duty to report them to disciplinary author-
ities.222  With respect to Pless, he committed his misconduct in Illi-
nois, the state whose supreme court decided the most famous case
imposing discipline on a lawyer for failing to report the misconduct of
a fellow lawyer.223  Surely there are lawyers at the University of Illi-
nois who know of Pless’s misconduct with sufficient certainty that re-
porting is mandatory.224  Sargent told his lies in Pennsylvania, which
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect mea-
sures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2012).  In addition, “A lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
at R. 5.1(b).  Law schools are not law firms, and Rule 5.1 does not apply to deans
and other “supervisors” in law school administrations.  Nonetheless, the example
of Rule 5.1(a), along with the theory behind its enactment, should be instructive
to law school deans.  Rule 5.1(a) “prevents the most influential lawyers in a
firm—partners—from ignoring the behavior of other lawyers in their firms.”
Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J.
231, 238 (2007).  Law schools are now aware that (1) at least some schools have
brazenly lied about statistics to the ABA, U.S. News, and prospective students,
(2) other schools have disseminated advertisements that use the schools’ data in
a manner likely to mislead reasonable readers, (3) the unadorned data presented
on law school websites and elsewhere is itself often misleading, and (4) law school
scholarship offers often omit material information necessary to a fair evaluation
of awards.  Like partners at a firm, law school deans are the most influential
members of their organizations, possessing the greatest ability to set expecta-
tions for ethical conduct and to ensure that employees live up to those expecta-
tions.  Deans should make clear to their subordinates that misleading marketing
is not to be tolerated, and they should establish practices and procedures for en-
suring honest communications.  Reasonable practices and procedures will not en-
sure perfection, especially if a rogue employee is willing to deceive superiors.
Nevertheless, a good system would set a proper “tone at the top” and should catch
most misleading communications before they are made.
222. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 171, at 99 n.74 (“[L]aw professors occasionally
engage in misconduct that would be reportable under Rule 8.3 or its equivalent.
If their colleagues are aware of such conduct but do not report it, those colleagues
are violating the rule.”).
223. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. 1988) (imposing one-year suspension);
Richmond, supra note 213, at 182 (“Himmel clearly sent a message to the Illinois
bar.  In the first year after Himmel was decided, Illinois attorneys’ reports of pro-
fessional misconduct increased by 500%.”).
224. See ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 2 (presenting detailed report of outside investi-
gators hired by the university).  One odd wrinkle is presented because Pless is
licensed in Washington, not Illinois. See Greenbaum, supra note 209, at 295–97
(discussing questions that “arise if the reporting lawyer and the lawyer poten-
tially to be reported are licensed in different states”).  As it happens, an Illinois
advisory ethics opinion specifically addresses the issue. See Ill. State Bar Ass’n,
Advisory Op. 94-23 (1995) (“Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct require a law-
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also has a mandatory reporting rule.225  Villanova officials possess a
report prepared by outside counsel concerning Sargent’s miscon-
duct.226  While the outside lawyers need not report information they
learned while representing the university,227 lawyers at Villanova
“know” Sargent engaged in serious misconduct.  For example, the law
school’s dean is a lawyer,228 and it seems highly unlikely that he is
ignorant of the conduct of his predecessor.
Some readers may wonder, having delved this far into an article
that (1) accuses law school officials of serious ethical rule violations
and (2) argues that lawyers with knowledge of such violations must
report them, whether the author of such an article is required to re-
port the violators identified in the article to appropriate disciplinary
authorities.  My answer is that I do not believe I am obliged to file any
bar complaints.  First, I am licensed to practice in New York,229 and
neither of the most egregious violations—that is, those of Pless and
Sargent—involve New York lawyers.230  (Then again, if a New York
lawyer has a duty to report the misconduct of lawyers licensed in
other jurisdictions,231 this argument will not help me.)  Second, nearly
all my knowledge of the misconduct discussed above comes from pub-
yer admitted to practice in Illinois to report misconduct of lawyers who are not
admitted to practice in Illinois.”).
225. See PENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012); Penn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2002-11 (2002) (lawyer must
report former partner who, despite lacking license to practice law in California,
assisted a client with pro se appearance in that state).  Because Sargent is li-
censed in Massachusetts, the issue of out-of-state lawyers is again presented. See
supra note 224.
226. The other Villanova professor fired for involvement in the deceit, see supra note
29, is likely also a lawyer.  Villanova officials with knowledge of that person’s role
likely have reporting obligations similar to those related to Sargent’s misconduct.
227. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2012) (“This Rule does not re-
quire disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 . . . .”); id. at R. 1.6
(providing broad rule of confidentiality for “information relating to the represen-
tation of a client”); Richmond, supra note 213, at 195–200 (noting that Rule 1.6
covers far more than is protected by the attorney-client privilege).
228. See Curriculum Vitae of John Yukio Gotanda 5, available at http://works.bepress.
com/gotanda/cv.pdf (listing memberships in multiple bars).
229. I live in Missouri but am not licensed here.  As far as I know, no Missouri-li-
censed lawyers are discussed anywhere in the article.
230. The New York Law School marketing, see supra notes 56–80, is a closer case.
Without more information about the NYLS “study” and the mental state (and
identities) of any lawyers who produced the marketing materials at issue, I be-
lieve that I do not have knowledge of serious professional misconduct.
231. There is not much authority on whether a lawyer licensed in one jurisdiction
must report the misconduct of lawyers licensed elsewhere. See Greenbaum,
supra note 209, at 296–97 (collecting a few advisory ethics opinions with diver-
gent conclusions).
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lic information available to every reader of this article,232 implying
that if I have a duty to report, so does anyone who has read from the
start of the article to this sentence, at least if they trust my cita-
tions.233  The reporting requirement is more sensibly limited to law-
yers with first-hand knowledge of misconduct or, at a minimum, some
access to information not widely available to the public.234  The con-
trary interpretation, requiring anyone who reads reliable reports
about misconduct to file a discipline complaint, would create an unen-
forceable rule and would undermine the purpose of Rule 8.3, which is
to bring hidden misconduct to light.235
C. How and Why to Use Bar Discipline to Curb Dishonest
Law School Marketing
We have seen that lawyers have violated professional conduct
rules by engaging in misleading law school marketing, and the worst
offenders have thus far avoided professional discipline.  Perhaps some
bar complaints are in order.  Anyone possessing good information that
a lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct may file a bar com-
plaint.236  Further, in at least some states, disciplinary authorities
have a practice of informing complainants of their responses to com-
plaints, including when a complaint is deemed to be without merit.237
If, for example, a complainant concerned about the good name of the
University of Illinois College of Law were to report Paul Pless to the
232. My non-public information is limited to what I have learned in response to earlier
drafts, including some explanatory comments from law schools named in this
article.
233. Indeed, a duty might similarly be imposed on anyone who read about Pless’s and
Sargent’s conduct in a reputable newspaper.
234. For example, while news media have reported on the data manipulation commit-
ted by Pless at the University of Illinois, neither I nor the general public has
access to the spreadsheets he altered, much less to the underlying student data.
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2012) (“Reporting a violation
is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.”); see
also id. at R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (noting that rule was written to avoid being “unenforce-
able,” in contrast to predecessor rule that required too much reporting to be
respected).
236. The complainant need not be a lawyer, much less a lawyer obligated to report
under Rule 8.3.
237. See, e.g., Filing a Complaint, ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/
LawyerRegulation/FilingaComplaint.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“At the
end of the investigation you will be informed in writing if your complaint will
proceed to prosecution in the State Bar Court or if it will be closed.”); How to
Submit a Request for Investigation, ATT’Y REGISTRATION & DISC. COMM’N SUP. CT.
ILL., https://www.iardc.org/htr_filingarequest.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013)
(“We will notify you in writing of our decision whether to investigate about two
weeks after we received your request.  If we determine that there is not a suffi-
cient basis for us to investigate, our letter to you will explain the reasons for our
decision.”).
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Washington State Bar Association, someone would inform the com-
plainant whether Pless’s conduct is considered serious enough to war-
rant a disciplinary proceeding.238  If the complaint is dismissed, the
complainant can request further consideration by a review committee
of the disciplinary board.239
Some recent law graduates have filed lawsuits against their law
schools, alleging all sorts of misconduct, including misrepresentation
and deceit.240  While it would of course be improper for these alumni
to file bar complaints in an effort to gain advantage in a civil mat-
ter,241 the existence of these suits implies that the plaintiffs sincerely
believe that some law school officials have engaged in professional
misconduct.  A bar complaint will not yield the financial benefits
sought in class-action litigation,242 but it might provide some measure
of justice and could encourage schools to improve their conduct.  Also,
law students and recent graduates are well placed to serve as private
attorneys general.243  They know the sorts of statistics collected by
their law schools, such as salary data.  They know the precise wording
of scholarship offers.  They have convenient access to marketing
materials such as brochures, websites for admitted students not made
available to the broader public, and statements of school officials sent
in response to inquiries by prospective students.244  Their willingness
to expose misleading law school marketing would help to improve le-
238. See The Grievance Process, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-
and-Lawyer-Conduct/Discipline/File-a-Complaint-Against-a-Lawyer/The-Griev
ance-Process (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
239. See id.
240. See infra notes 242 and 247.
241. See Futrell v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 189 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Ky. 2006); Va. State Bar
Disciplinary Bd., Order No. 08-052-071266 (2011).
242. The success of these suits is by no means certain. See, e.g., Gomez-Jimenez v.
N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 856–57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (dismissing suit
against law school and holding that “plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied
on NYLS’s alleged misrepresentations . . . because they had ample information
from additional sources and thus the opportunity to discover the then-existing
employment prospects”), aff’d, 956 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).  The trial
judge ruled, in essence, that no reasonable consumer would have relied on the
law school’s statistics. See also Mark Hansen, Judge Dismisses Alumni Lawsuits
Against Two Chicago Law Schools, ABA J. (Nov. 12, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/judge_dismisses_alumni_lawsuit_against_john_
marshall_law_school/ (reporting dismissal of class-action suits against John Mar-
shall Law School and Chicago-Kent College of Law).
243. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (defining “Private Attorney
General”).
244. For example, if the recipient of a scholarship offer requests additional informa-
tion by e-mail concerning the terms of the award, a law school official (if a lawyer)
would be obligated by Rule 8.4(c) to avoid misrepresentations and deceit when
replying.
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gal education, and those who come forward should be admired for
their courage.245
Another advantage of pursuing bar discipline is that, despite its
problems, it beats the alternatives—at least some of them.  Professors
Morgan Cloud and George B. Shepherd have argued for criminal pros-
ecution of law schools, their deans, and others for “mail and wire
fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and making false statements.”246  I
expect, however, that few if any prosecutors will jump at the chance to
indict law school deans for federal felonies related to misleading law
school marketing, irrespective of whether a good case exists in theory.
Similarly, although the prospects of class action litigation against law
schools are beyond the scope of this article, it will suffice to say that
the plaintiffs’ success is far from certain.247  Bar complaints, by con-
trast, may be filed without waiting for a prosecutor to bring a case,
and complainants will not need to prove complex class action require-
ments such as “typicality.”248  Given the quick response of the Illinois
bar to Himmel—in which the state supreme court suspended a lawyer
245. Complainants should of course have a good-faith basis for any complaints; frivo-
lous complaints are not helpful.  Even when acting with solid evidence of viola-
tions, however, complaining students and lawyers will take significant risks. See,
e.g., Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. 1998); Douglas R.
Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 199 (2007).
246. Morgan Cloud & George B. Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, MO. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing).  For some other perspectives on misleading law school marketing, see Daniel
S. Harawa, Note, A Numbers Game: The Ethicality of Law School Reporting Prac-
tices, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607 (2011); Bruce Strong, Jewish Law and the
Ethics of Law School Admissions Practices, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (2012);
see also John Steele, Comment to Ben Trachtenberg’s Article on Deceptive Law
School Marketing, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Dec. 27, 2012, 6:19 PM), http://
www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2012/12/ben-trachtenbergs-article-on-deceptive-
law-school-marketing.html (linking to various earlier posts on related issues).
247. See supra note 242 (noting dismissal of suits against various schools); see also
MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., Case No. 1:11-CV-00831-GJQ, 2012
WL 2994107, at *11 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012) (dismissing suit by alumni de-
spite finding that “the statistics provided by Cooley and other law schools in a
format required by the ABA were so vague and incomplete as to be meaningless
and could not reasonably be relied upon”). But see Arring v. Golden Gate Univ.,
No. CGC-12-517837 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. July 19, 2012) (denying motion to
dismiss); Hallock v. Univ. of San Francisco, No. CGC-12-517861 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. July 19, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss); Mark Hansen, Saying ‘La-
bels Matter,’ Judge Permits Law School Alumni Suit over Job Stats, ABA J.
(Dec. 4, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_denies_
thomas_jefferson_sols_motion_for_summary_judgment_of_alumni/ (reporting on
denial of Thomas Jefferson School of Law’s summary judgment motion against
lead plaintiff).
248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Another benefit of bar discipline over litigation is that a
bar complainant need not show damages.  Deceit violates Rule 8.4(c) even if no
one suffers harm. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012).
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for failing to report the misconduct of another249—chances are that
even a very small number of successful discipline cases concerning law
school marketing could have a significant effect on the marketing
practices of American law schools.  If the supreme court of one state
imposes some level of public discipline on a law school employee for
sending a misleading brochure, greater attention to accuracy is likely
to follow across the country.
In addition, because many bar associations offer advisory opinions
about professional conduct rules,250 lawyers could inquire about
whether certain law school marketing tactics violate the rules of vari-
ous states.251  If the facts of an inquiry were sufficiently close to the
actual practices of law schools, an opinion advising that the conduct
violates ethical rules could be quite effective in encouraging law
schools to adopt greater “fairness and straightforwardness.”252  These
advisory opinions could also serve to bring greater attention to mis-
leading law school marketing among the bench and bar.  Many law-
yers and judges subscribe to the advisory opinions issued in their
jurisdiction to stay on top of developments in legal ethics.  For those
who have not considered the misleading practices common at Ameri-
can law schools, a few dispassionate analyses by bar counsel applying
state professional conduct rules could be quite informative.253  Fur-
ther, if bar counsel concludes that law school officials may continue to
mislead without violating any current professional rules, that finding
might help justify law reform efforts.
A few caveats are in order here because despite its potential advan-
tages, bar discipline cannot cure all that ails us.  First, many law
school officials, including those in charge of admissions and career ser-
vices offices, are not lawyers, meaning they are beyond the authority
of bar discipline.  The same misleading law school marketing might or
might not justify action by bar counsel depending on who precisely at
249. See supra note 223.
250. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Process, SUP. CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., http://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/Advisory.asp (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013).
251. I am considering making such inquiries myself and may present the results in a
subsequent article.  Inquiries might be especially useful in New York, where an
appellate court—in the process of affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit against
New York Law School—stated that NYLS “and its peers owe prospective stu-
dents more than just barebones compliance with their legal obligations” and that
“to join and continue to enjoy the privilege of being an active member of the legal
profession, every prospective and active member of the profession is called upon
to demonstrate candor and honesty.” See Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 956
N.Y.S.2d 54, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
252. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (discussing how a lack of “fair-
ness and straightforwardness” may constitute dishonesty even absent false
statements).
253. The same would be all the more true of actual discipline cases.
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the law school is responsible, and in at least some cases, it will be
difficult to determine before conducting an investigation whether any
lawyer conduct is at issue.  Further, unless bar counsel in one state
feels like expending resources to investigate the wrongdoing of law-
yers licensed elsewhere, misleading law school marketing committed
by lawyers not licensed where they happen to work will be difficult to
police.  If, for example, a lawyer licensed in Oregon commits miscon-
duct related to his job as the admissions director of a law school in
Florida, the lawyer’s home bar counsel would face substantial logisti-
cal hassles if it wished to pursue the matter.  Bar counsels have lim-
ited budgets, making it difficult to meet with witnesses located across
the country.
Second, because the misleading nature of garden-variety law
school statistics is common in legal education, law school officials
charged with misconduct not involving brazen deceit will have a plau-
sible defense that their adherence to industry standards—however
flawed—should not subject them to individual discipline.  The argu-
ment might go something like, “If my presentation of overly-cheery
salary data on a law school webpage constitutes misconduct under
Rule 8.4(c), then hundreds of lawyers are equally guilty.  Surely we
cannot all be deemed dishonest.”  Especially in states requiring know-
ing dishonesty to establish a Rule 8.4(c) violation, an industry stan-
dards “safe harbor” may seem plausible.  Even recklessness may be
difficult to prove in some cases.
IV. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
If current rules of professional conduct cannot stop misleading law
school marketing, at least two additional avenues for reform exist.
First, current rules—particularly Rule 8.4(c) and Rule 7.1—can be
amended if necessary.  Second, organizations responsible for review-
ing the conduct of law schools, such as the ABA and the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS), can use their power to encourage bet-
ter behavior at recalcitrant law schools.
A. Current Rules Could Be Amended if Necessary
If existing rules of professional conduct governing lawyers do not
prevent a lawyer from disseminating misleading law school market-
ing, they could be amended so that they do.  The rule prohibiting dis-
honesty could be interpreted (where it is not already) to cover
statements made with reckless disregard for their falsity, particularly
if those statements concern legal education.  And the scope of rules
regulating lawyer advertising can be expanded to include advertise-
ments for legal education.
916 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:866
1. Rule 8.4(c)
As discussed above, Rule 8.4(c) is already interpreted as prohibit-
ing dishonesty outside the practice of law.254  Not all states, however,
have decided what mental state is required for a violation.  That is,
must dishonesty be intentional, or can reckless falsehoods qualify?255
Because the rule exists to ensure the “trustworthiness” of lawyers,256
reckless falsehoods should count when they concern matters of great
importance.  Put simply, someone who is reckless with the truth—at
least when communicating about grave matters—is not trustworthy.
The more important the subject of a communication, the more appro-
priate it is for the bar to punish reckless falsehoods.257  As the Pream-
ble to the Model Rules notes, “a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of
the law . . . and work to strengthen legal education.”258  Misleading
law school marketing undermines legal education by breeding cyni-
cism among the next generation of lawyers and by enabling schools to
charge fees the market otherwise might not bear.  Misleading market-
ing increases the indebtedness of future lawyers, thereby increasing
unhappiness among lawyers and decreasing their ability to serve the
public interest.  It also increases the likelihood of outside intervention
in legal education—for example, by United States Senators concerned
about misuse of federal loan funds259—which undermines the largely
self-governing nature of the profession.260
2. Rule 7.1
Rule 7.1, which by its terms applies only to lawyer advertising,
prohibits inaccuracies far more strictly than does Rule 8.4(c).261  Be-
cause Rule 8.4(c) can potentially cover any area of a lawyer’s life, a
254. See supra notes 175–85 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 204.
256. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012).
257. This in keeping with the general limitation of Rule 8.4(c) to material statements.
See supra note 176.
258. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (2012).  The importance of legal educa-
tion is further demonstrated by bar admission requirements imposed by most
states. See infra note 268.  Because aspiring lawyers generally need law de-
grees—a regulatory fact of great economic value to law schools—it is fair for the
profession to regulate statements concerning legal education more strictly than
other statements unrelated to the practice of law.
259. See Mary Beth Marklein, Law Schools Pressed to Tell the Truth on Job Place-
ment, Debt, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/news/education/story/2011-10-24/ABA-law-schools-student-debt/50898362/1
(reporting efforts by Sens. Barbara Boxer and Chuck Grassley).
260. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 11 (2012) (“To the extent that law-
yers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for govern-
ment regulation is obviated.  Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession’s independence from government domination.”).
261. See supra note 206.
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narrower scope for Rule 7.1 is appropriate.  However, the close connec-
tion of legal education to the legal profession, along with the demon-
strated inability of law schools to police their own communications for
inaccuracies, may justify expanding the scope of Rule 7.1 to include
advertisements for legal education.  The first sentence of Rule 7.1
reads, “A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”262 A potential new com-
ment to Rule 7.1 could read, “For purposes of this rule, ‘the lawyer’s
services’ include legal education being offered or provided by the law-
yer or the lawyer’s employer.”  Advertisements for legal education
would then be subjected to the strict regulations on lawyer advertise-
ments, including the prohibition on innocent misstatements and on
boastful statements not capable of verification.263  If that medicine is
too strong, the following clause could instead be added to the first sen-
tence of the rule: “nor shall a lawyer negligently make a false or mis-
leading material communication about legal education services offered
or provided by the lawyer or the lawyer’s employer.”264
B. ABA and AALS Law School Accreditation Reviews
Should Assess Honesty in Marketing
Independent of professional conduct rules governing lawyers, orga-
nizations already tasked with regulating law schools can encourage
honest marketing by enforcing existing rules and, if necessary, devel-
oping new ones.  The ABA and the AALS conduct regular evaluations
of most American law schools, and their paying more attention to mis-
leading law school marketing could sharply reduce the problem.  If
these organizations prove unable to solve the problem, the federal gov-
ernment (which empowers the ABA to accredit law schools for pur-
poses of certain federal programs) and state supreme courts (many of
which limit bar admission to graduates of ABA-accredited schools) can
replace or supplement the ABA with a more effective regulator.265
1. ABA
Under federal regulations,266 the Council and the Accreditation
Committee of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2012).
263. See supra note 206.
264. The medicine could be watered down further by replacing “negligently” with
“recklessly.”  Because a specified culpable mental state already includes all more
serious mental states, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (1985), the amended rule
need not provide that intentional misstatements are covered.
265. Also, U.S. News could effect important changes by altering the data it collects
from law schools, and especially by checking reported data for accuracy—and
lowering the rankings of schools that report inaccurate information.
266. See 34 C.F.R. § 602 (2012).
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the Bar are recognized by the United States Department of Education
(DOE) as the accrediting agency for programs that lead to the J.D.
degree.267  In addition, states consider ABA accreditation when decid-
ing who may apply for admission to the bar, with many states requir-
ing a degree from an ABA-accredited school and many others
imposing significant additional requirements on applicants without
such degrees.268  In effect, the state supreme courts and legislators
requiring ABA accreditation have delegated their authority to evalu-
ate the quality of legal education possessed by would-be members of
state bars.  Some delegation of this kind is sensible because it avoids
the needless duplication of effort that would be required were every
state to conduct its own assessments of all legal education providers.
The particular delegation at issue, however, remains sensible only
as long as the ABA discharges its responsibilities well.269  If the ABA
cannot use its accrediting power to ensure honest law school market-
ing, state authorities should consider supplementing ABA accredita-
tion (or replacing it entirely) with approval by another organization
capable of evaluating law school advertising for honesty and trustwor-
thiness.  Such an organization could audit employment statistics, re-
view law school brochures, websites, and other marketing materials,
and conduct whatever further investigations are necessary to assess
compliance with professional standards.
At a minimum, the ABA should recognize the importance of honest
law school marketing, and schools engaging in deceit and misrepre-
sentation should be sanctioned.  The ABA already has Standard
509(a) (“Basic Consumer Information”) on the books,270 which pro-
vides, “A law school shall publish basic consumer information.  The
267. In the remainder of this section, I use “ABA” as a shorthand for the Council and
the Section, as well as for the ABA more generally.  For background on the ABA’s
role, see the ABA’s publication on the law school accreditation process at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2010_
aba_accreditation_brochure.authcheckdam.pdf.
268. See NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL ED. & ADMISSION
TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2012, at
8–13 (2012).
269. See Mark Hansen, Sen. Grassley Questions ABA’s Law School Accreditation Pro-
cess, ABA J. (July 13, 2011, 12:57 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
grassley_seeks_answers_on_abas_law_school_accreditation_process/ (“In the let-
ter, Grassley cited a report last month in the Chronicle of Higher Education say-
ing the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, the U.S.
Department of Education’s recognized accreditor of law schools, had been found
noncompliant with 17 department regulations by a federal panel that reviews
accrediting agencies, including failing to consider student-loan default rates in
assessing programs; having no set policy for handling student complaints; and
not having a standard for job placement by its member institutions.”).
270. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
2011–2012, Approval Standard No. 509 (2011) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL 2011–2012].  Following amendments in summer 2012, the standard is
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information shall be published in a fair and accurate manner reflec-
tive of actual practice.”271  Consumer information is defined as includ-
ing admission data, tuition, fees, living costs, financial aid, and
refunds, placement rates, and bar passage data, among other
items.272  Interpretation 509-4 explains further: “Standard 509 re-
quires a law school fairly and accurately to report basic consumer in-
formation whenever and wherever that information is reported or
published.”273  Accordingly, no new rulemaking is required before the
Council and the Section can take action against dishonest law school
marketing.
New rules (beyond the amendments enacted over the past year)
would nonetheless be useful—as would better-designed ABA data col-
lection forms, which could be introduced under existing rules.  More
specific disclosure requirements could assist law schools in their ef-
forts to produce honest data, and they could be particularly helpful in
ensuring the creation of comparable reports across institutions, al-
lowing prospective students to compare schools against one another.
In addition, if the ABA promulgates rules requiring transparent re-
porting of data, a school’s failure to obey the rules would be relevant in
professional discipline cases.  Today, a law school official accused of
violating Rule 8.4(c) on the basis of misleading statistics posted to a
law school website might well assert that the school’s page was no
worse than those of pretty much every other American law school; in-
deed, this Article could help establish an “everyone was doing it” de-
fense.  In the future, however, violations of ABA reporting rules—
while not themselves directly punishable under professional conduct
rules—could demonstrate the intentional (or, in some states, reckless)
mental state needed for a finding of punishable dishonesty.
Despite the existence of Standard 509—as well as others requiring
honest reporting274—the ABA declined to impose any significant sanc-
tion on Villanova after discovering that the law school dean and three
other administrators had conspired to lie to U.S. News, prospective
students, and the ABA itself about the composition of its entering clas-
entitled “Consumer Information.” ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013,
supra note 101, Approval Standard No. 509.
271. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2011–2012, supra note 270, Approval Standard
No. 509.
272. Id. Approval Standard No. 509 Interpretation 509-1.  As amended, this require-
ment now appears at Standard 509(b). ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL
2012–2013, supra note 101, Approval Standard No. 509(b).
273. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2011–2012, supra note 270, Approval Standard
No. 509 Interpretation 509-4.  As amended, this requirement now appears at
Standard 509(a). ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013, supra note 101, Ap-
proval Standard No. 509(a).
274. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL 2012–2013, supra note 101, Approval
Standard No. 101 Interpretation 101-1 (“These documents must be complete and
accurate and submitted timely in the form specified.”).
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ses.275  The ABA concluded that “the conduct of the Villanova Univer-
sity School of Law in connection with the intentional reporting of
inaccurate admissions data to the ABA and to the public was repre-
hensible and damaging to prospective law school applicants, law stu-
dents, law schools, and the legal profession.”276  The ABA’s sanctions
consisted of (1) a public censure, which the law school must post on its
website and elsewhere, (2) a requirement that Villanova make a pub-
lic statement about good data reporting practices, and (3) a require-
ment that the law school hire a compliance monitor for at least two
years.277  This light punishment, imposed after the law school’s dean
was caught committing “reprehensible” conduct, appeared to effec-
tively preclude the ABA from taking serious action against the many
law schools disseminating merely misleading data.  How could the
ABA justify sanctions against Rutgers-Camden for its misleading e-
mail advertising or New York Law School for its misleading website,
much less a law school whose unreliable statistics are no worse than is
common in the industry?  After all, Villanova received a slap on the
wrist for brazen deceit committed at the highest levels.
More recently, however, the ABA punished the University of Illi-
nois College of Law for its deceit—along with the environment that
encouraged it—fining the school $250,000.278  Rejecting arguments
that similar conduct (i.e., that of Villanova) had resulted in censure
but no fine, the ABA concluded:
[T]he College of Law did not adequately appreciate the connection between (a)
establishing aggressive goals, placing authority for admissions decisions in a
single individual who stood to gain personally and professionally from meet-
ing or exceeding the established goals, and the lack of oversight of data report-
ing; and (b) the ultimate publication and reporting of false data.279
Time will tell whether the ABA’s more vigorous policing of law
school marketing will reach conduct less outrageous than that of Paul
Pless and those who enabled him.
Rather than merely punishing deception that comes to light (or, in
the case of the ABA, often failing to do even that), an accrediting body
committed to ensuring honest marketing would take affirmative steps
to promote transparency, good faith, and fair dealing.  For example,
ABA site visits could include an evaluation of the law school’s market-
ing material, including a careful comparison of employment statistics
posted online and elsewhere against the underlying data possessed by
275. See VILLANOVA CENSURE, supra note 10.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Mark Hansen, U of Illinois Law School Is Publicly Censured by the ABA,
Fined for Misreporting Admissions Data, ABA J. (July 24, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/u_of_illinois_law_school_is_publicly_censured
_for_misreporting_admissions_d/.
279. See ILLINOIS CENSURE, supra note 30, at 2–3.
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the law school.  Careful attention would have revealed that for years,
when asked by the ABA to report average total indebtedness of their
graduates (i.e., the amount borrowed to finance three years of study),
some schools instead gave the ABA figures representing only one year
of borrowing (numbers then reported by publications like U.S. News
and the National Jurist), thereby allowing the schools to appear two-
thirds less expensive than peer institutions.280  Those debt numbers
were not plausible, yet neither the ABA nor U.S. News investi-
gated.281  Even after the errors came to light, schools continued to
boast of their recognition for “financial value” on the basis of inaccu-
rate data.282  A recent announcement that the ABA will work with the
Law School Admission Council to check the accuracy of certain data
reported by law schools—such as incoming students’ LSAT scores and
college GPAs—is a good first step.283  Further ABA action, such as
random auditing of law school statistics, may be made possible by the
fine collected from the University of Illinois.284
If the ABA is unwilling to enforce Standard 509 effectively, the
DOE should find a new accrediting agency for J.D. programs.  Fur-
ther, state supreme courts (and other state authorities charged with
deciding who may sit for the bar) could consider requiring certification
280. See Paul Campos, The Wisdom of Solomon, INSIDE L. SCH. SCAM (July 26, 2012,
7:07 AM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-wisdom-of-
solomon.html (reporting that Barry, Georgia State, and Rutgers-Camden misre-
ported their student debt loads, causing national publications to list them as good
values); see also Rebecca Larsen, Best Value Law Schools, NAT’L JURIST, at 24–25
(Nov. 2011), available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/cypress/nationaljurist
1111/#/24 (relying on inaccurate data to rank Georgia State first in the nation for
value and to give Rutgers-Camden an “A-” for value).
281. See Katy Hopkins, 10 Law Degrees with Most Financial Value at Graduation,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2011/03/29/10-law-degrees-with-most-financial-
value-at-graduation (listing average student debt for Rutgers-Camden as
$32,235, a number one-third of that reported by Rutgers-Newark, a school with
about the same tuition).
282. Rutgers School of Law-Camden Earns Recognition as Smart Career Investment,
RUTGERS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/camden/rutgers-school-
of-la-20110404/ (“According to the article, Rutgers–Camden ranks third among
the nation’s law schools in terms of graduates commanding the highest first-year
salaries relative to debt load.”); U.S. News Ranks Georgia State Law Second in
Nation for ‘Financial Value at Graduation’, GA. ST. U. C. L. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://
law.gsu.edu/admissions/6202.html.  As of February 17, 2013, both webpages re-
main available.
283. See ABA and LSAC Announce Program for Reporting of Entering-Class Data,
A.B.A. (June 15, 2012), http://www.abanow.org/2012/06/aba-and-lsac-announce-
program-for-reporting-of-entering-class-data/.
284. See ILLINOIS CENSURE, supra note 30, at 1 (listing, among other sanctions im-
posed, “the imposition of a $250,000 monetary sanction on the College of Law
that will be placed in a separate, designated fund and used by the Section for
monitoring and enhancing compliance with the data reporting and publication
requirements of the Standards by all ABA-approved law schools”).
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by an independent auditor that the school’s marketing complies with
best practices (and, at a minimum, does not violate Rule 8.4(c)) before
a school’s graduates become eligible for admission to the bar, just like
many now require ABA accreditation.285  State regulators could also
conduct independent reviews of law schools located within their juris-
dictions, evaluating whether the schools’ marketing materials meet
the standards of good faith and fair dealing that the state courts apply
in other consumer protection contexts.
2. AALS
The Association of American Law Schools, which conducts site vis-
its and evaluations of law schools before approving their continued
membership in the AALS, should recognize the importance of honest
law school marketing, and the AALS should sanction schools engaging
in deceit and misrepresentation.  The University of Missouri hosted a
joint ABA/AALS site visit during October and November of 2011.  Al-
though the resulting AALS report is confidential, I am willing to re-
veal that while it contains sections on matters as diverse as
scholarship, teaching, externships, nondiscrimination, library re-
sources, and the physical plant, there is no section assessing the fair-
ness and accuracy of the law school’s marketing.286
Like the ABA, the AALS already has rules in place that—if en-
forced—could largely eliminate misleading law school marketing
among its members.  For example, the requirements of membership
for an AALS law school include, “A member school shall deal fairly
with applicants for admission.”287  Pursuant to an AALS executive
committee regulation,
A member school shall provide to anyone requesting an application the follow-
ing information: recent historical data regarding the academic qualifications
of its student body, attrition rate, student activities and groups, and employ-
ment patterns of its graduates; and information concerning the school’s grad-
285. The creation and maintenance of such an organization would require a great deal
of effort (and would cost law schools money), and the project should be under-
taken only if the ABA refuses to take its responsibilities more seriously.  Also,
some provision would be necessary for students who enrolled at a school reasona-
bly believing it to be adequately accredited.
286. It is possible that AALS reports have confronted some law schools about their
marketing practices.  Because these reports are confidential, however, I have no
way of knowing.
287. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 2012 HANDBOOK 60 (2012), available at http://www.aals.
org/about_handbook.php (AALS Bylaw § 6-2(c)).  In November, the AALS sanc-
tioned Villanova pursuant to Bylaw 6-2(c) for the misconduct described earlier in
this article. See Letter from Susan Westerberg Prager, supra note 29 (announc-
ing AALS Executive Committee decision placing law school on probation for two
years).  Action against Illinois is likely forthcoming.
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ing system, retention rules and procedures, non-discrimination policies, and
financial aid programs and policies.288
Violation of AALS rules can result in sanctions, including suspen-
sion from the association.289  The AALS therefore already has author-
ity to sanction member schools failing to provide accurate information
concerning the “employment patterns of its graduates.”  In addition to
sanctioning offenders, the AALS could issue a “statement of good prac-
tices” announcing appropriate methods of law school marketing.290  If
well-written, this document would not only assist schools desiring to
behave well but would help expose misbehaving schools as falling be-
low industry standards.  Like violations of ABA rules, violations of
AALS best practices would not themselves be punishable under pro-
fessional discipline rules.  They could, however, help bar counsel prove
allegations of intentional (or reckless) dishonesty, thereby providing
additional incentive for compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
In a primer on business law, a New York lawyer once warned pro-
spective law students about “deceptive statistics,” which “give inter-
esting reports of the alleged net earnings of [law] graduates.”291  The
author warned that the results of a salary study “are entirely mislead-
ing and deceptive” to the ordinary reader because (1) of the law gradu-
ates surveyed about their salaries, “only about one-half replied,” and
(2) “those who failed and those who were making small returns”—as
well as “those who had dropped out of the law altogether”—did not
answer.292  The resulting number therefore “was averaged really only
from the earnings of the most successful graduates.”293  Ninety years
have passed since the publication of this advice book, and too little has
changed.  It is far past time for law schools to publish better statistics.
Seeking to attract students, and the tuition that comes with them,
law schools have engaged in misleading marketing, occasionally com-
mitting outright deceit.  Because lawyers are prohibited from engag-
288. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., supra note 287, at 92 (AALS Executive Committee Reg-
ulation 6-2.3).
289. See id. at 65–67 (including Article 7 of the AALS Bylaws).
290. The AALS has issued statements of good practices on topics such as faculty re-
cruitment, handing the resignation of faculty members, and the discharge of ethi-
cal responsibilities by faculty members. See id. at 125–48.
291. See 2 THOMAS CONYNGTON, BUSINESS LAW: A WORKING MANUAL OF EVERY-DAY
LAW § 652, at 733 (2d ed. 1922).
292. Id.
293. Id.  The author also noted that if his book was less bullish on the legal profession
than was another volume then in print, “it is because it considers more carefully
the situation of the ambitious young man who must work his own way, who is not
a graduate of Harvard or Yale, and who must force his upward way from the
outside with no foundation of family and social connection upon which to build.”
Id. § 653, at 735 n.3.
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ing in dishonesty and misrepresentation, this misleading law school
marketing violates rules of professional conduct and exposes partici-
pating lawyers to professional discipline.  Lawyers with knowledge of
these violations should report offending lawyers to disciplinary au-
thorities, whose members should safeguard the integrity of the profes-
sion by treating misleading law school marketing with the seriousness
it deserves.  In addition, the ABA and the AALS—or a new accrediting
organization, should the ABA and AALS fail to rise to the occasion—
should take responsibility for ensuring honest marketing by American
law schools.  Legal education is in crisis, and a commitment to good
faith and fair dealing in law school marketing is a necessary part of
any worthwhile solution.
